Evaluation

Foreword

The Police Training Academy at what was formerly Växjö University and is now Linnaeus University was tasked with evaluating the "Stockholm Gang Intervention and Prevention Project". As we understand it, it was the project manager who pushed through the requirement for an independent external evaluation by people with research expertise. We would like to begin by praising the project management team for this initiative. Otherwise, basing an investigation on research principles is not something that ordinarily happens in the Swedish police. There is therefore reason to point out what we see as some fundamental cultural differences between the manner of dealing with criticism in the police organisation and in academic contexts.

The starting point for academic criticism is that everything can be done better. This criticism therefore has the aim of contributing towards development. The researcher who presents a text at a seminar and who only receives praise would probably have his ego boosted. From a professional point of view the individual in question would, however, view the seminar as less useful. A similar approach naturally also applies within the police force. However, at the same time, there is a risk of criticism being perceived as meaning that a person has made a mistake or not done his or her job. The reader who is not familiar with the research approach should, therefore, bear in mind that the critical points of view put across in this evaluation are not for the purpose of questioning the project but aim to contribute to the development of future police projects, including with regard to the relationship between objectives and resources allocated, setting realistic objectives and carefully documenting what happens in a project.

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Summary

The presence of criminal gangs/networks in Norra Botkyrka and threats made to police personnel at Södertörn Police District in 1999 constituted the genesis of the Fittja Commission. The Commission was later given the name, SGI (Särskilda Gäng Insatser - Special Gang Initiatives) and made permanent. The "stop and search" method played a prominent role in their work, however, after a while the criminals seemed to adapt and it became more difficult to find weapons and drugs using this mode of operation. It consequently became necessary to develop working methods and this later resulted in an application to implement an EU funded project.

The Stockholm Gang Intervention Project (SGIP) began in 2009 with the objective of producing a general model/concept/approach with regard to how police organisations could tackle street gangs. The project received extensive financial support from the EU. The Police Training Academy at Växjö University/Linnaeus University was given the task of evaluating the SGIP project. The assignment was formulated as a multi-dimensional project evaluation covering the project's entire framework with a special focus on the achievement of quantitative targets and an evaluation of the project's scientific connection.

From the outset, Stockholm Police did not allocate the anticipated operational resources required to achieve the project objectives that had been formulated. The operational resources available were continually reduced during the period of the project. In addition, the personnel the unit had at its disposal were required for other tasks that involved purely line operations, without any connection to SGIP's activity. The original project objectives were retained, and these circumstances should be taken into account when reading through which of the project's objectives were achieved.

Results

The project presents a model called Panther for how police organisations can tackle street gangs. The basic philosophy of the model is that an analysis of networks should constitute the basis for how to tackle gangs. Analysis of networks leads to identification of the gang's key members and is similar to the approach recommended in the National Criminal Investigation Department's KAP model. The panther model exemplifies important components in the police's work involving gangs and the importance of adopting a holistic approach when tackling gang problems. The project has also contributed to illustrating the value of conducting an analysis prior to implementation of a police initiative and various difficulties that might be associated with operational developments within the police force.

Four fundamental working methods have been identified:

- Putting pressure on criminals in a certain area by checking addresses, vehicles and individuals. There is support for this method in international research and it has traditionally been used extensively by SGI. However, due to changes in organisational conditions, the method has had limited application during the SGIP period.

- Having close collaboration between investigators and operational staff during investigative work. This has proved beneficial in driving investigations forward and

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gaining increased knowledge of different groupings. On the other hand, changes in organisational conditions have impeded the ability to apply and develop this working method during SGIP.

-       Cooperation with other authorities in order to focus on the criminals' money and assets with a view to making it more difficult to live a criminal lifestyle. There is support for this way of working in theories about situational crime prevention. It has been possible to continue to develop this form of working during the SGIP project.

-       Influencing and making it easier for individuals to leave criminal gangs. During SGIP, it has been possible to formalise and develop this method, which has support in Rational Choice theories.

Eighteen objectives have been set out in the project plan in the application to the EU with different levels and degrees of abstraction. There have been problems in evaluating several of the objectives due to the fact that the evaluators have not had access to the information requested nor to details of how certain objectives have been formulated, e.g., the objective that the numbers of strategic gang members should be reduced by 25%. There is no description of what is meant by a strategic gang member, which individuals in the police district are to be regarded as belonging to this body and which individuals are no longer defined as strategic gang members.

On the basis of the data made available to the evaluators, it is deemed that 4 of the project's 18 objectives have been met and that a further 2 objectives have probably been met. The objectives that have been met are that the project has established a local intelligence and investigation register, held two conferences in Stockholm, given presentations both externally and internally and participated in the public debate by giving interviews and writing an opinion piece for a newspaper.

Contents

1. Introduction

1.1 The aim of the project

The project received EUR 1,181,000 (equivalent to about SEK 12 million when the project started) with the objective of producing a model/conceptual approach for how police organisations could tackle street gangs (page 16[1]). Among other things, the project was to develop an effective, comprehensive guide that could be implemented locally, regionally and nationally by the EU's member states. The idea was that the project would conduct a number of initiatives based on a specific methodology and draw conclusions from these initiatives. There would be collaboration with police authorities in other countries, the plan being to arrange workshops and seminars and hold two conferences in Sweden.

1.2 Background

The local police force was set up in Norra Botkyrka in 1994, staffed mainly by inexperienced police officers that were posted there. The expectation was for the personnel to intervene against the same individuals without police officials having carried out any risk analyses of what consequences this might have. This way of working led to several police officers being threatened, and a number of police officers voluntarily changing districts as a result. There were also compulsory transfers. The Fittja Commission was set up in autumn 1999, largely as a reaction to the threats against the police personnel. The Commission was later given the name, SGI (Särskilda Gäng Insatser - Special Gang Initiatives). Cooperation between SGI and the local police in Norra Botkyrka was extremely limited.

SGI worked in an aggressive fashion, with the amount of staff at its disposal enabling it to safely make determined interventions. More than thirty police officers worked at SGI during this period. The unit [2] consisted of three external groups and investigation personnel. Several interviews indicate that it would have been an advantage if the local police, which had a network of contacts in the area, had been able to continue working in parallel with SGI. This was not to be the case and, in practice, Norra Botkyrka was emptied of the local police personnel as new personnel were introduced to the unit when individuals left. The last local police officer in Norra Botkyrka left in 2001.

From the beginning, SGI's mode of operation largely consisted of stopping and searching individuals and vehicles. This created a certain amount of irritation among young people in Norra Botkyrka. As the local police had disappeared, along with the relationships they had developed, there was less chance of bridging the antagonism that had arisen. There was also some criticism of SGI's way of working in the media. To start with, these methods were successful, and a large quantity of weapons and drugs were seized. However, criminals appear to have adapted to SGI's methods and hid weapons instead of carrying them on their persons etc. This is something that has also emerged during interviews with other units working throughout the county as a whole, i.e. that these types of controls rarely led to anything in

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[1] All page references are to the book, "The Stockholm Gang Model PANTHER".
[2] SGI will be referred to as a unit throughout the evaluation report even though the formal description internally is a section.

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Norra Botkyrka. It thereby became necessary to develop these methods. For example, the unit began attempting to access the proceeds that criminals derived from crime by collaborating with the senior enforcement officer.

In addition to the need to change the initial working methods, the conditions for SGI were also changed in other ways. Its area of responsibility was eventually expanded from Norra Botkyrka to the entire Södertörn Police District. The unit was, for example, used to tackle problems on the commuter train to Nynäshamn. As a result of the extended area of responsibility, it was more difficult to put pressure on criminals in a certain area. Their duties were not focused in time and space, but were dispersed. At the same time, the number of employees at SGI was reduced. There was substantial pressure on the police district during this period, with competition primarily for personnel working outside. For example, seven police offices were opened in the police district, two of which were in Norra Botkyrka. The consequences of SGI's limited personnel resources will be discussed later in this report.

1.3 The evaluation assignment

The research application states that an external evaluation will be carried out, encompassing:

1. *SGI's methods.*

2. *New methods developed by SGIP and the practical police work between police officers and researchers.*

3. *Cooperation with foreign police organisations and how the exchange of knowledge has been important for the development of the SGI method.*

4. *Cooperation with strategically selected national authorities.*

5. *The police's investigatory work and issues concerning the intelligence services during the project*

6. *The outcome and expected results.*

It also states that elements of the evaluation carried out externally will be used in the practical manual, which will be of use to crime prevention authorities in the EU. The application states that the manual will be completed during the autumn of 2011.

The Police Training Academy at what was then Växjö University and is now Linnaeus University was tasked with evaluating SGIP. The tender [3] for the evaluation assignment states that it should be a multi-dimensional project evaluation, covering the project's entire framework with a special focus on the achievement of quantitative targets and an evaluation of the project's scientific connection. The evaluation should also follow the implementation and in particular study a number of selected elements such as:

• Achievement of objectives

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[3] In the tender drawn up on 7/4/2009, page 1.

- The project's scientific connection
- Cooperation between different authorities
- Coordination between the line organisation and project implementation

The plan was for data collection to take place through interviews, participative observation and studying original sources.

1.4 Conditions for tackling the evaluation

Several of the evaluation points were such that the project had to get underway before their design could be organised. For example, it was not possible to arrange the evaluation of an SGIP method until the method was defined by the project. Similarly, SGIP was forced to decide which authorities were strategic ones before an evaluation of any cooperation with them could be carried out. As regards the evaluation of the actual project results, is was also necessary for SGIP to define what kind of gangs were present in the district and to survey them before the evaluation work could be planned. This meant that initially it was not possible to formulate the evaluation work other than at a very general level.

Stefan Holgersson was recruited half way through the project when the person responsible for the evaluation was assigned other duties. Various types of information were requested during the evaluation work. These requests were conveyed to those responsible for SGIP but it transpired that they were largely unable to fulfil them. These included, what kind of activities the personnel had been involved in, examples of different types of gang leaders on which the project had focused, the direction of the project during different periods of time and the reporting of method selection. The evaluation has also been made more difficult due to the fact that some answers have been contradictory and on some occasions, fluctuating. This has meant that several sources have been required in order to confirm stated circumstances.

The fact that the data SGIP supplied did not meet the requirements that existed made the evaluation work problematic, affecting not only the ability to evaluate the outcome of the project but also how the evaluators could support SGIP in the development process. The problem of getting access to relevant data during the evaluation work meant that it was not possible to contribute material to the manual or the conferences. However, the evaluators were able to provide some advice with regard to the contents of the manual.

An additional factor that affected the conditions for the evaluation was that several of the project's objectives and evaluation points were unclear and could be interpreted in different ways.

To sum up, the factors described above have affected the ability to carry out the evaluation work. The terms of reference and different methodological issues and problems will be dealt with later in the report in order to facilitate assessment of the extent to which it has been possible to answer the different evaluation questions.

2. Results and assessments based on the evaluation assignment

In this section, the evaluators' assessments will be presented on the basis of the six points included in the task (see above).

2.1 SGI's methods

The first part of the evaluation assignment involves evaluating SGIP's methods. To do this required defining what are to be considered SGI's methods. Were they the working methods that the personnel at SGI actually adhered to or were they the methods they endeavoured to use in their work? Were they the previous working methods or the working methods that it was relevant to apply as a result of the SGIP project?

Due to the wording of the second point in the evaluation task: "**New methods developed by SGIP**", we concluded that it was the working methods [4] applied by SGI that should be evaluated under this point. We also interpreted this as meaning that there was to be an evaluation of how the personnel in SGI worked in accordance with these methods during the project.

In order to be able to define SGI's working methods, we have studied various documents and carried out interviews with personnel and previous managers. Fifty or so individuals who served or are serving at SGI or who have links to SGIP have been interviewed. This has involved both operational personnel who are part of or have been part of SGI's external groups and personnel working or who have worked indoors. The manager who set up SGI and his successor and also the current SGI official have been interviewed. Prior to the evaluation, Stefan Holgersson had also begun to carry out participative observations and interviews of personnel in connection with other research (see, for example, Holgersson, 2005; 2008; Holgersson & Knutsson, 2011; 2012) which could be used in the analysis.

The four ways of working below could be defined as constituting SGI's basic methods:

1. Putting pressure on criminals in a certain area by checking addresses, vehicles and individuals.
2. Investigatory work in relation to individuals belonging to particular groupings.
3. Targeting criminals' money.
4. Influencing and making it easier for individuals to leave criminal gangs.

Point 4 was more about isolated cases and specific police officers taking the initiative to help individuals to leave a criminal gang than an explicit method. As regards both points 3 and 4, SGIP constituted an important incentive for future development.

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[4] In this context, the term working methods also includes ways of working that had not been formalised.

2.1.1 Putting pressure on criminals in a certain area by checking addresses, vehicles and individuals.

From the outset, SGI (the Fittja Commission) was intent on putting pressure on individuals in Norra Botkyrka and also making it difficult for them to carry weapons. This method mainly involved brief surveillance initiatives in order to rapidly establish reasonable suspicions. This often involved stopping and checking a vehicle or carrying out a raid on a particular address. It entailed being on the offensive and actively looking for opportunities and, when these emerged, proceeding as quickly as possible with the cases. SGI's way of working with regard to putting pressure on criminals in a particular area had developed as a result of police officers' own ideas and experiences they had gained.

However, there are distinct similarities between SGI's way of working and what research has indicated could be effective. Wilson (1994) came to the conclusion that the police can influence violent crime where weapons are used through actively counteracting possession of weapons at high-risk locations and at high-risk times (see also Sherman, et al. 1995). Sherman and Rogan (1995) consider that the tactic of taking weapons from high-risk individuals does not permanently prevent them from carrying weapons, but is perhaps sufficient to cool off their feelings towards a certain person they had intended to shoot (Sherman & Rogan, 1995). The working method SGI's personnel applied proved to have an effect if it was concentrated on specific times, places and individuals in order to create pressure (see, for example, Knutsson, 1995; Sherman, 1990). Participative observations and interviews indicate that the police staff at SGI found a large number of weapons at the beginning, but that this subsequently happened less frequently. The increased pressure from the police led to weapons not being carried in the same way as before.

SGI has reported its interventions in overall figures, e.g., the number of weapons seized, the number of drug crimes discovered and the number of years in prison to which individuals were sentenced. A quantitative focus where, for example, the number of seizures constitutes a measurement of success, leads to more problems (see Holgersson, 2007; Holgersson & Knutsson, 2011). Police personnel often place a value on their work based on crimes detected and individuals charged. The structure of the reporting system is one reason for what police personnel regard as good policing. There is a risk that successful tactics for, among other things, reducing the availability of weapons in an area are at risk of being abandoned if the norm for a successful outcome is the number of seizures and individuals charged. A working method that entails reducing the availability of weapons will, by definition, not actually be successful when the focus is on the number of weapons seized, i.e., if the police's activities are successful and there are fewer individuals carrying weapons, the number of seizures will reduce. If the number of weapons seized is a measurement of success, the police's activity will thereby appear unsuccessful. The conclusion can be drawn that this is how it has been evaluated in this case, and this is one reason why this working method has decreased. Other reasons that pressure on criminals diminished in Norra Botkyrka is that the area of responsibility increased - from having initially only covered Norra Botkyrka to including the entire police district. The fact that there was a decrease in the number of persons at SGI has also been significant in terms of the capacity to implement tactics based on putting pressure on criminals in a certain area.

This aggressive working method decreased further during the project period (SGIP), only occurring to a minor extent. SGIP's project managers endeavoured to change the way the structure of the work was focused, moving toward a focus not on certain problems in an area

but on selected individuals in a network. During the LIMA initiative, a network was frequently monitored. SGIP was set up in 2009, with its operational side getting underway in the second half of 2010. However, as early as 2008/2009, the external personnel had changed their tack, first focusing on one gang and then moving on to another gang in the autumn of 2009. These two gangs were based in areas other than SGI's original focus area (Norra Botkyrka). The initiative against the first gang was described as successful while the second one did not have the anticipated outcome. A relevant question to attempt to answer is whether changes in the operational focus – working on one gang at a time - has had any resulting effect?

In several cases, it has emerged during interviews with area police officers that individuals with a criminal record in the police district's most crime-ridden area, Norra Botkyrka, had complained that there were too few checks on whether people were carrying weapons. They have expressed concern that this had led to it becoming more common for people to carry weapons. Interviews with individuals working and living in the area [5] indicate that firearms have become more common in recent years. Roughly six months after SGI had changed the focus of its work, the number of shootings in the police district increased. The majority of these shootings took place in Norra Botkyrka, where SGI had previously applied the most pressure. Other units in the form of police offices and dedicated groups served in the area but were not able to create the same pressure as SGI had succeeded in doing. From just a few shootings in the police district each year, there have been a total of 39 shootings from 2009 up to June 2012[6]. Individuals were shot in 26 of these cases, with 3 victims dying. On one occasion when the target was missed, the target's dog was shot dead instead. There are a further seven shootings where it has been difficult to establish what has been used in the shooting and whether it really was a firearm, as well as cases where people have been shot at with soft air guns and air rifles.

Of course, it is difficult to say how things would have developed if SGI had continued with its checks. Bearing in mind that research had shown that interventions had an impact when they were concentrated on specific times, locations and individuals so as to create pressure, it is not possible to rule out the fact that changing the way of working has had a negative effect on the state of affairs described above. In this context it should, however, be mentioned that SGI has experienced a considerable reduction in personnel and been given an increased area of responsibility, so even if the focus at SGIP had been different it would not have been possible to achieve the pressure that had previously been exerted. The intensity of SGI's work had already reduced before the operational focus was changed. In addition, SGI was forced to move to another police station, meaning that it took longer for personnel to get to Norra Botkyrka during the project period. The SGIP project management team stated that the move would affect results and stressed that it was important that this change should not be implemented. Police officials had other priorities than SGI.

To sum up, support can be found in research to suggest that SGI's method of putting pressure on criminals by checking vehicles, addresses and individuals in an area could have had an effect, but that this was only put into practice to a minor extent during SGIP.

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[5] Interview with an individual who has been working at a youth recreation centre over a long period and who lives in the area, and a security guard with many years' experience of the area.
[6] Data from the Criminal Intelligence Service (Source: RAR, review of cases with cime code 9341-9344, 0375-0378 and 0303-0313)

2.1.2 Investigatory work targeting individuals who belong to certain groupings

When individuals who belong to a criminal gang are suspected of a crime, the aspiration has been for SGI to take on these investigations. Investigation personnel at SGI often have a great deal of personal knowledge about individuals in gangs and relationships between them. This made investigatory work easier. Traditionally, the leader of the preliminary investigation has been very active in various cases and SGI's operational personnel have been involved in the investigatory work where different measures could be performed quickly. Operational personnel have often been able to get involved at an early stage of the investigation process. The above factors have made it possible for there to be an impetus behind the investigations dealt with by SGI.

During recent investigatory work, there has not only been an interest in taking criminal proceedings against individuals, but also in investigating opportunities to limit the proceeds that criminals derive from crime (see point 2.1.3). There has also been an endeavour to build confidence among the different parties involved. Interviews with personnel at SGI indicate that focusing on confidence building has been beneficial for the investigation work, for the ability to obtain different types of intelligence information and for attempting to influence criminals to change their criminal lifestyles.

The application of this working method under SGIP displays similar problems to those described in section 2.1.1 (above), including the fact that reduction in external staffing has had an impact on the ability to conduct successful investigations. In addition, SGIP's investigation personnel have been allocated investigations that have not been linked to the initiatives. The SGIP project manager stated that:

> " We have had a large number of investigations along the way that have not been linked to the initiatives ... the district has given us investigations in order to bring down caseloads. I would like to state that the investigations that were not linked to the initiatives represented a major part of SGI's activity over the last three years."

To sum up, it is clear from interviews and participative observations that SGI's way of conducting investigations has been favourable for aspects including enabling the successful completion of investigations and bringing criminal proceedings against gang members for crimes. There are, however, indications that the activities targeting gang-based criminality were less effective during the project period compared with previously due to the reduction in staffing, the change of managers and the allocation of a large percentage of cases without any link to the unit's focus.

2.1.3 Targeting criminals' money

A working method developed at SGI is to go after criminals' money. The aim of this method is to reduce the financial proceeds of crime and to make it more difficult to live a criminal lifestyle. The method targets the serious criminals that police encounter in their day-to-day activities at street level. The idea is that criminals may be less motivated to accept a punishment if they risk losing the profit. This can make it less attractive to commit a crime and there is less glorification of the criminal. Support for this working method can be found in the theory concerning situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1997), which, in turn, is based on rational choice theories (see also Cornish & Clarke, 1986). It may, of course, be the case that

a criminal who owes money will commit a crime to repay the debt, but the basic idea of focusing on minimising the rewards from crime has a sound theoretical basis.

Another conceivable effect of this working method is reducing the risk of criminal individuals becoming models for young people. When young people see that people can drive around in expensive cars, wear expensive watches and gold chains etc. and can "*throw money around*", there is a risk of these young people thinking: *"I want that life too".* Particularly if things are going badly for them at school, making it difficult for them to get a job. There is also support for this idea in the above-mentioned theories.

Accessing an individual's proceeds from crime involves obtaining an overall picture of their finances. This is normally done at the coordination meetings held with the social security office, the tax office and the enforcement officer. In the beginning the social services attended these meetings too, but this came to an end as most of the individuals concerned were not receiving social security benefits. The coordination meetings are held as necessary and this has been every six weeks on average. At a coordination meeting there is time to discuss an average of five or six individuals. At and prior to these meetings, the police pass on the names and personal ID numbers of individuals that other authorities need to monitor. Besides these meetings, case workers are in continual contact regarding individual cases.

A prerequisite for this activity is the interpretation of the Official Secrets Act that enables information to be shared between authorities. Information can be exchanged because an official decision has been taken making it possible to cite the public interest in order to take action against this type of problem. An assessment of whether information can be provided between authorities is required in each individual case. Information from the police can lead to the tax office arbitrarily increasing an individual's tax assessment, thereby producing a tax debt. The enforcement officer may request assistance from the police to collect the debt. The fact that the tax office has discovered that a person is working without declaring earnings can affect benefits from the social security office. The authorities' activities are linked to each other. Cooperation between the authorities increases the chances of getting at serious criminals who are also exploiting the benefits system, have untaxed income and who do not pay their debts.

New legislation on extended forfeiture has given the police greater powers to seize property. Certain offences, for example aggravated robbery, can trigger forfeiture. If a person is sentenced for a crime, it is possible to forfeit property if it is more likely that it comes from criminal gain than some other activity. Previously it was necessary to link money and property to the crime for which the individual was suspected. Having made an arrest for a crime, if the police find property that could be subject to forfeiture, they apply for extended forfeiture[7]. A check is subsequently made with the enforcement officer. Of course, criminals adopt countermeasures. From a crime prevention point of view, it is important that the legislation is formulated in such a way as to make the criminal lifestyle more difficult and that gaps in the legislation are continuously plugged. It is clear from interviews that this is moving far too slowly at the moment.

This working method is linked to the investigatory work in such a way that it does not just involve obtaining information to enable criminal proceedings, but it is also an attempt to obtain information in order to get at the criminal's proceeds from crime. The external

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[7] Forfeiture of assets that cannot be linked to a specific crime.

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personnel's work is also important in terms of being able to access criminals' proceeds from crime. In connection with a raid, the police may find that a person receiving housing benefit does not live at the address to which the benefit applies. Contact with the social security office may lead to the benefits being cut and the person having to repay them. This contact takes place in the form of documents being prepared, checked for confidentiality and distributed. Another piece of information that could be of interest to other authorities is whether, and if such is the case where, a person is working. It may also be necessary to carry out observations to ascertain whether the person in question is using a particular car that he or she does not formally own. A couple of further observations will perhaps suffice to seize the car. In terms of vehicles, the general rule is that three observations spread across a few weeks are enough for this to be considered a case of concealed ownership. Other information is also taken into account, for example, the context in which the car has been seen and where it has been parked. Who has paid for the car, insurance and repairs, as well as what close relatives/friends say about ownership is also of interest.

Generally speaking, this type of surveillance is easier to carry out compared with surveillance to investigate crimes. It has, however, proven to be the case that it is not very easy to get police personnel to carry out surveillance for the purposes of accessing criminals' money. The direct outcome of such surveillance work is not seizures and arrests, which seems to be the prevailing norm among some police officers for what is primarily regarded as good policing. This attitude did not just apply to external personnel. It turned out to be the case that managers only allowed a short period for work to establish, for example, whether a person was working at a certain place. These attitudes have not been completely eradicated under SGIP, but the basic philosophy during the project has made it easier to shift the definition of good policing so as to also include work involved in accessing criminals' money.

When SGI started working in this way, it involved cooperation at managerial level. This cooperation then passed on to caseworker level. During interviews it has been stated that it was important to cooperate at managerial level first for two reasons, firstly so that the respective authority would feel confident about the cooperation and, secondly, so that the respective authorities would set aside the desired resources. The police officer who initiated this way of working has continued to develop the concept under SGIP. It is likely that this form of working would have been developed further even without SGIP, but the EU project's focus on the problem of gang crime has facilitated the development work.

Between 2009 and 2012, property totalling SEK 3 million was seized within the framework of this form of working. Individuals' tax assessments were increased by approx. SEK 10 million (Gustafsson, 2011). It should be pointed out that this outcome is partly the result of initiatives started within SGIP. Similarly, activities targeting certain individuals that commenced during SGIP have still not had any tangible results. There is a delay in an initiative having an effect. The total reported includes activities targeting individuals who are not part of the gang on which SGIP focused.

To sum up, there is solid support in research for whether SGI's method of going after money has an effect. This form of working has been subject to continuous development by SGIP.

2.1.4 Influencing individuals and making it easier for them to leave criminal gangs

Prior to SGIP there was no written action plan for how the police could influence individuals and make it easier for them to leave criminal gangs. It was more a case of individual police at the unit taking the initiative to facilitate this for individuals. This work was formalised and developed under SGIP to become an explicit working method. The method is consequently on the verge of being regarded as a new method.

Support for this method can also be found in rational choice theories (see also Cornish & Clarke, 1986). It does not just involve influencing individuals but also making it easier for these individuals to leave the gang. This working method is resource-intensive and requires a high level of availability. In order to get an insight into how this might proceed, an example is provided anonymously so that identification is not possible:

> *Per makes contact with the gang crime unit. Two police officers from SGI arrange a meeting with him. He has recently been in jail and is really angry because no members of the gang visited him or gave him money. Visiting gang members at institutions and also ensuring that they received financial support during their custodial sentence were rules of the gang. As the gang had not followed these rules, it was Per's understanding that he could leave the gang in so-called good standing. However, this was not the gang's opinion, and they wanted a large sum of money from Per because he wanted to leave the gang without "valid reasons". By now Per had grown tired of the criminal life and he wanted to leave it behind him and start afresh. Unless Per paid the money, he was at risk of getting into trouble, something which Per also conveyed to the police personnel. The police told him in broad terms what this involved and the sacrifices that he needed to make. This was not put across in a frightening manner, more like sowing a seed, an idea and an alternative to the life he was living. Per said that this was a big thing and that he needed to think more about it all, but that it sounded interesting. A police officer said that Per could phone him at any time and that if he didn't answer Per could leave a message and he would phone him back. If an emergency arose, Per was to call 112. The police officer's assessment of the situation was quite clear. Per wanted to leave the criminal path but the sacrifices involved in this did not tip the scales at this stage. As regards the threats against Per, they were not sufficient to make Per want to leave the criminal life behind. A large part of the first meeting was about establishing trust and confidence. Per needed to feel that the police were listening to him so that he would want to speak to them again. The first meeting went well with Per and the police exchanging telephone numbers and agreeing that they would be in touch again after a few days.*
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> *Some days later, one of the police officers who was at the meeting phoned Per. Per was happy that the police officer had phoned and told him a little about what he had been up to. Per told him he had thought about what the police officer had said during the meeting but that he could not drop out at the present time. He did not intend to pay the money the gang was demanding from him. Over the next few months, the police officer and Per were in touch by phone at regular intervals. During these conversations, it was noticeable that Per was weighing up the advantages and disadvantages and that he was going through a process within himself.*
>
> *One evening Per phoned. He had been attacked by the gang and the police officer convinced Per that he should come in for questioning and tell him everything about it. The police officer made direct contact with a section leader at SGI who was able to arrange for someone to go there and carry out video questioning with Per. However, after the questioning Per began to waver again. The information Per had provided during the video questioning, enabled a preliminary investigation to commence, but it proceeded slowly as there was no hard evidence.*

It was not sufficeint to act as a coercive measure. After a motivational conversation, Per was once again willing to cooperate, but he was still unwilling to leave the criminal path. The police officer continued to maintain contact with Per but nothing much happened until about a month and a half later when the officer's mobile phone rang late one evening. A person was crying on the phone. One of Per's relatives had been attacked at home. After a while, the police officer was able to make contact with Per, who said something along the lines of: "Now it has gone too far. This had better be the end of it".

A day or so later, Per visited the police station to talk about what should happen. He was put in contact with the personal safety group but a little later the group announced that Per no longer wanted to be involved. The police officer who had been in contact with Per spoke to Per along with the personal safety group and, after the conversation, Per was all for receiving support and assistance from the police and others. Per was supported by the personal safety group and, shortly afterwards, ended up under their supevision. A few months later the police officer who had initiated the contact with Per received a call. Per was upset about his housing situation. The police officer tried to "pep up" Per, telling him that it was only temporary and that things would take a little while to organise. Per seemed to understand most of this.

It was to be almost a year and a half before the police officer who had had the initial contact with Per again had contact with him. Per phoned to tell him that everything had sorted itself out really well and he thanked the police officer several time for pushing him and not giving up. Per said that he was very grateful for the support.

The lessons learned from working with defectors are:

- To listen - which contributes towards inspiring confidence and trust.
- To take a "careful" approach – the initial aim is to sow a "seed".
- To be very available – a person may phone at any time and it is often important to be able to act immediately.
- To bear in mind that this is a process – it is a big step for an individual to take.
- To be persistent – don't give up. Setbacks are natural and the length of time it takes to achieve the goal varies.
- Not to close the door – to keep the door ajar, even after setbacks.

It has been difficult to follow up on the outcome of this operation since staff pass defectors on to other units and this work is surrounded by a great deal of secrecy. The figure stated at interviews is that from three to a maximum of seven defectors may be involved. Interviews have indicated that during the three years that SGIP has been active it has succeeded in getting a few individuals to defect. Whether the defectors belonged to the gang that SGIP was targeting and that had been involved in the initiative is not clear from the data to which the evaluators had access. It has also emerged that some individuals who had defected had reverted to their previous behaviour.

To sum up, there is support in research to suggest that the SGI method can be effective in making it easier for individuals to leave criminal gangs. This working method has been formalised and further developed under SGIP. It has not been possible to evaluate the outcome of the activity in any great detail on the basis of the information to which the evaluators have been given access.

2.2 New methods developed by SGIP and the practical police work between the police officers and researchers.

This evaluation point entails investigation of two matters: evaluation of new methods developed by SGIP and evaluation of the practical police work between police officers and researchers.

2.2.1 New methods developed by SGIP

In the conclusion to the manual produced as part of the project, the project manager writes that work in many other crime-prevention authorities in Europe is conducted in a similar manner to that advocated in the model for crime prevention that has been developed in the project (the Panther model, see p. 110 ff). We have, therefore, interpreted the term "new methods" as encompassing the ways of working that are new in relation to the methods previously applied at SGI.

The basic idea during SGIP has been to analyse a gang before considering taking action against it, and taking a holistic approach to the action taken. A criminal gang can be regarded as a network organisation. Key individuals are of vital importance in this type of organisation, and the working method illustrated during the project involves finding these individuals and focusing the work on them. There is support in theories to suggest that focusing on key persons can have an effect on the organisation's ability to function effectively (see for example McGloin, 2005). SGIP has emphasised the importance of combating gangs holistically, i.e., taking an overall approach and adapting operational initiatives in accordance with whatever has emerged during the analysis. It is also possible to find extensive support in research regarding the importance of analysing the scenario before an initiative is carried out (see for example Goldstein, 1979; 1990; Eck & Spelman, 1987). Another approach stressed in the project is to have a media strategy for issues concerning gang problems. The police's statements in the media may, for example, favour certain groupings if these groupings are mentioned by name, thereby gaining attention. Finally, it has been pointed out during SGIP that it is important that the police tackle gang members in a satisfactory way. The police's conduct not only has an effect on an intervention but can also have a positive effect in the longer term.

The various new procedures that SGIP recommends will be analysed in greater detail in chapter three.

2.2.2 The practical police work between the police officers and researchers

This point is somewhat unclear. The evaluators have interpreted this as evaluating how effective the dialogue has been regarding the practical police work between the police officers and researchers.

The methods at SGI have been produced through an inductive approach, i.e., the link to theory has traditionally been regarded as a weak one. In many areas, SGI's methods have been developed on the basis of a specific police officers' ability to analyse and reflect. These officers established that serious crime needed to be tackled in other ways than increasing the intensity of the random stop and search method.

Researchers and police officers have conducted a dialogue regarding the practical police work. One police officer commenced a postgraduate research programme immediately after the project started. This provided positive opportunities to introduce research as part of the practical police work. Another SGIP employee had previous experience of research. This has also made it easier for the SGI methods to acquire a theoretical foundation by studying different theories and by making contact with international researchers interested in issues regarding gang problems. According to the project manager at SGIP, Mike Kautsky [8] has assisted the project with the difficulties in implementing theories in organisations like the police. David Brotherton[9] has contributed towards the production of the Panther model and holistic policing. A large part of the ideas concerning defection comes from Decker (Pyrooz & Decker, 2011). Cooperation has taken place with Stockholm University with regards to the analysis of networks. Some elements of the cooperation with Växjö University/Linnaeus University have also been important. Experiences and ideas that have arisen as a result of the work at SGI/SGIP have proven of interest for researchers to study and the project manager in particular has had contact with various researchers.

To sum up, a dialogue has taken place between external researchers and, in the main, two individuals who are part of the project and who have research experience.

2.3 Cooperation with foreign police organisations and the way in which the exchange of knowledge has been important for the development of the SGI method.

This point also includes the evaluation of two matters: how effective cooperation with foreign police organisations has been and in what way the exchange of information has been important for the development of the SGI method.

2.3.1 Cooperation with foreign police organisations

It is clear from the material obtained that cooperation with foreign police organisations has not involved operational work. The accounts of journeys indicate that his has instead involved holding or attending presentations during visits that can be defined as traditionally arranged study trips. According to the project manager at SGIP, their cooperation partners have arranged seminars during these visits.

2.3.2 The way in which the exchange of knowledge has been important for the development of the SGI method

The explicit question the project evaluation has to answer consists of a fact that was established even before the project began, i.e., that the exchange of knowledge was important for the development of the SGI method – it is not surprising then that this was the case.

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[8] Law Enforcement Coordinator, Ridgewater Community College, Willmar, Minnesota, USA.
[9] Professor of Sociology – *John Jay College of Crim inal Justice, City University of New York, USA*

Moreover, the term "SGI method" is used. There has probably been some confusion between the terms "model" and "method", or that it should actually be called "the SGI methods". Otherwise it is difficult to know which of the SGI methods is referred to.

The SGIP project manager believes that experiences from cooperation partners have been important in developing the work in SGIP. From the material made available to the evaluators, however, it is not possible to draw the conclusion that the exchange of knowledge (from other police organisations) has been important for the development of the SGI methods.

2.4 Cooperation with strategically selected national authorities

SGI has been cooperating with other authorities ever since being set up.

This cooperation has primarily involved giving various forms of presentation in order to disseminate knowledge of what form gang problems take and the challenges facing society. Personnel at SGI have also given presentations to the Regional Public Prosecution Office, the Swedish National Courts Administration, the National Board of Institutional Care and the Prison Service. Some of these authorities have attended more presentations than others.

With regards to the Prison Service, SGI has made a continuous contribution to basic training courses in Stockholm. Presentations have also been given to individual institutions, the head office and to the Probation Service. As regards the National Board of Institutional Care, SGI has also taken part in a number of meetings and presentations. Interviews indicate that the frequency of presentations to authorities has been lower during SGIP than in the period prior to the project. The project management is of a different opinion and considers there not to have been any less of this kind of presentation during the project than previously. No statistics regarding the number of presentations given have been provided to the evaluators.

Disseminating the type of information suitable for communicating in the form of presentations is a form of cooperation. Another form of exchange of information has a more operational focus. SGI has been involved in operational cooperation with the Prison Service ever since it was set up. Likewise, there has been ongoing cooperation with the Regional Public Prosecution Officer on various matters. Swedish Customs and the Enforcement Service have been involved in the cases and received information so as to be able to take action against certain individuals. Maintaining close operational cooperation with other authorities is important in successfully tackling organised crime. This often involves specific information having to reach a particular official quickly. It is then important to have developed a contact network and to have established cooperation between the different authorities at caseworker level. Participative observations and interviews indicate that SGI quickly developed this form of cooperation and that this cooperation between different authorities is something that has continued during SGIP.

A third form of cooperation between authorities involves developing the local intelligence centres[10]. In this context there has been close cooperation between, primarily, the Police, the Enforcement Service, the National Tax Board and the Social Insurance Agency. This cooperation began during SGI and the development of this form of cooperation has continued

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[10] A network of actors from different authorities (see page 77). They share information and cooperate with the aim of getting at serious, organised criminality.

during SGIP. Participative observations, interviews and the outcome of this activity indicate that this cooperation has been successful. It has generated trust at caseworker level and this has been a prerequisite in conducting work successfully (see also section 1.2.3 "Targeting criminals' money").

To sum up, cooperation with other authorities had already been initiated under SGI, and was developed under SGIP.

2.5 The police's investigatory work and issues concerning the intelligence services during the project

2.5.1 The police's investigatory work

A large number of the investigations SGIP's personnel have worked on have no link to the initiatives carried out within SGIP. The allocation of cases has instead involved different forms of investigatory work where the police district has allocated investigations to SGIP to bring down caseloads. The SGIP project management team has stated to those responsible that this is a problem. The manner of allocating cases combined with small numbers of staff at SGIP has affected the chances of succeeding in the project objectives (see also chapter 1 with regard to the description of the investigatory work).

2.5.2 Issues concerning the intelligence services

SGIP has had an intelligence coordinator throughout the project. This person's task has been to scan, survey and keep the unit up to date with what is happening in the police district. The intelligence work has been organised traditionally, i.e., information has been obtained via the criminal investigation service, through their own sources and by means of open sources such as Facebook and other social forums. Intelligence information has been verified via network analyses and through surveillance projects.

Intelligence information has played a central part in the discussions held in various forms of meeting. Interviews and participative observations indicate that SGI has had a great deal of knowledge of individuals, networks and gangs. This knowledge has been developed under SGIP. The focus of the work under SGIP has been favourable for generating intelligence information. By concentrating the work on a specific gang and conducting more traditional surveillance, it has been possible to build up considerable knowledge of different individuals and behaviours in the gang environment.

2.6 The outcome and expected results

One way of interpreting this evaluation point is that it involves reporting whether the project has lived up to the expected results. The expected results are detailed in the project plan for the EU. We have consequently proceeded on the basis of the objectives set out for the project in this part of the evaluation, but have interpreted the "outcome" as a further description of the project, which also includes other forms of experience and conclusions drawn.

2.6.1 Prerequisites for the project

SGI has been organised into three operational groups and one investigatory group. In the mid-2000s the unit consisted of over 30 police officers. SGIP's budget shows that the project has applied for funds for 31 smartphones. If it is assumed that the idea was for every employee to have one of these phones, this means that the unit would be staffed by about 30 individuals

during the project. Admittedly, this would not have really brought staffing up to the level that SGI previously had, but it would nevertheless have been possible to keep three operational groups going. It is unclear why the number of staff was calculated in this way. The staffing at SGI was reduced before work on SGIP became relevant. On the other hand, the project objectives set out were retained.

For SGIP to achieve its objectives, it would have been necessary for the Stockholm police to have allocated more personnel resources to the project. SGIP's project plan does not describe the level of the operational resources that Stockholm police committed to the project. It is possible to draw certain conclusions based on the objectives set and information in other documents, but there is no specific figure.

During the entire project period, managers at SGIP have complained that the unit needs to be reinforced with further staff. Although the district's police officials have been continually informed of the need to reinforce staffing at SGI, operational capacity has instead been reduced during the course of the project. For example, a document drawn up on 23 June 2011 states that eight persons had left or were about to leave and that the unit had only received an addition of four persons during the same period. There were a total of 11 operational personnel at the time. A document that the SGI section manager later distributed to his superiors in the autumn of 2011 stresses that the unit needed to reinforce personnel in order to be able to achieve the objectives of the SGIP project:

> *In order to complete the research it is necessary that some operational initiatives are carried out during autumn 2011. These initiatives will focus on attempting to prevent the establishment of street gangs in Södertörn and will be evaluated by ourselves and by external evaluators ... For working environment and safety reasons, the section currently only has an external team ... The section should consist of two external teams and one investigatory team, as well as a coordinator. The total number of staff should be 21 persons.*[11]

The requirements the unit manager conveyed were not fulfilled. In addition to SGIP only having a small number of staff at its disposal, it was also utilised on normal line operations. From the middle of June until the beginning of September, SGIP had no operational capacity. Operational personnel were also used during other periods of the year, for example, in connection with demonstrations. SGIP thus had limited or no operational capacity whatsoever for relatively long periods during the project. The unit was also given assignments that fell outside the remit of the project. It should also be noted that, as previously mentioned, SGI's investigators had, to a great extent, to work to reduce caseloads not connected to what SGIP was working on. Taking into account the personnel resources available at SGIP, SGI did not, therefore, have the prerequisites to achieve the objectives stated in the project plan.

The project has not been run in the customary manner, for example, there are no clearly defined milestones and decision points. The project plan has not been adapted to the actual allocation of resources. In addition, large parts of the documentation that should have been required from a project of this size are missing. There are several reasons for the above shortcomings. One is that the project management team did not receive the support they expected from the steering committee and they were forced to bring the project to a conclusion and plan for an international final conference, among other things. The chair of the steering committee left the district during the project. Another reason is that the police authority did not ensure that managers received adequate training, which had an effect on the

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[11] ”*Plan for provision of personnel*”. Document drawn up by section head IngaLill Hult on 31 October 2011.

prerequisites for how the project was structured and how the project work was documented. The SGIP project manager has not had any project management training and had no experience of project management before the project commenced. The same applied to the project secretary. You could say that ordinary police officers, one of whom was accepted onto a research programme, were given the task of running an SEK 12 million project and did this as well as they could, given the conditions that existed. Additional management support was provided for the project just over half way through the project period (September 2010). During the end phase of the project, personnel were appointed to assist with the documentation work. Another factor that had a negative impact on the outcome of the project is that several different unit managers were responsible for SGI's ordinary activities during the project period. The SGIP project manager states that this was a problem and made it difficult to achieve all objectives:

> *We have not had any stability in the organisation, different managers have been responsible for the unit along the way, managers who have had different approaches and expertise regarding how the project is run and what is required in order to run a project the size of SGIP. Managers with different mandates and different ways of thinking about policing [...] other things were often more important than the project."*

The district's police officials had an interest in SGIP succeeding and the project was given a great deal of freedom to operate within the limits of the resources allocated. The police district has had problems managing ordinary police activities, which meant that the district's management team felt compelled to prioritise other operational needs over those of SGIP. It should be noted that the Stockholm police has had more personnel resources at its disposal during the SGIP project period than in mid-2000s, however, during the 2000s staffing at SGI was far higher than under SGIP. It is outside the scope of this evaluation to evaluate the manner of prioritising and to analyse the allocation of resources in Stockholm County.

To sum up, it could be said that based on the conditions that the police authority established, SGIP has had limited opportunities to achieve the objectives set out in the original project plan. The plan has not been subsequently modified on the basis of the actual allocation of resources.

2.6.2 The main focus of the project

On several occasions during the evaluation work we have clearly requested a statement showing when operational and investigative personnel were actually involved in the SGIP operation. This request has not been accommodated. The manual shows that Panther includes a follow-up system where operational personnel fill in what kind of duties they have performed (see page 152). This kind of data is lacking for the majority of the project. It was not until the end of the project that this kind of reporting was put in place. The above circumstances have affected the chances of carrying out a proper evaluation.

On the basis of the information to which we have been given access, it is clear that the project has implemented the Lima, Arion and Mungo initiatives. The LIMA initiative targeted a motorcycle gang (change of name to a motorcycle-linked gang during the project) that the project defined as a street gang. The gang was based in Haninge Municipality. The two other initiatives referred to a gang in Huddinge Municipality (Flemmingsberg) and a gang in Botkyrka Municipality (Norra Botkyrka). It is, however, only Lima that can be described as a

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genuine initiative. When it comes to the other two initiatives, it transpired that the two street gangs it was intended to target did not exist in the areas where the initiatives were to be implemented.

SGIP organised two conferences. The operational personnel were also involved in the planning and execution of both conferences, which consumed a considerable amount of energy.

2.6.3 Other activities

Personnel at SGIP have cooperated with police officers from different units in different contexts. This may have had a greater or lesser effect on initiatives and activities performed under the auspices of SGIP. Representatives from other authorities have stated that problems and initiatives in another police district (Södertälje) have been the driving force behind the forms of cooperation between the different authorities. This has not been evaluated within the framework of this evaluation.

The SGIP project management team and some decision makers closely connected to them have emphasised SGIP's major contribution to developing a network consisting of practitioners and researchers. They consider that this will be of importance for future projects and that the Ministry of Justice, among others, has shown great interest in the project. An assessment has not been made within the framework of this evaluation of how important the project could be in the future from this perspective.

2.7 How were the expected results achieved in SGIP?

The project plan in the application to the EU states that the expected results for SGIP are:

- *To survey criminal gangs in Sweden*
- *To create an intelligence and investigation register (Special Investigation Register)*
- *To prosecute 25% of strategic gang members*
- *To reduce the number of gang members and gangs in Södertörn Police District by 25%*
- *120+50 hours training for police officers and 50 hours training for police cadets.*
- *Nine (9) seminars with project partners in Denmark, the UK and Norway to exchange experiences and knowledge*
- *Disseminate knowledge about SGI and its methods and procedures in initiatives at two (2) conferences and seminars*
- *Illustrate SGI's positive experiences and best practices and its methods, e.g., protecting and supporting victims of crime and witnesses*
- *Develop a complete and effective guide that can be implemented locally, regionally and nationally by the member states.*
- *Create a platform and knowledge base for cooperation and exchange of information and experiences between crime-prevention organisations in the EU*

It also states that:

In order to achieve the best possible results, substantial energy will be put into disseminating the project's methods and results.

- *Paper presentations and posters to support the dissemination of the project's activities*
- *A project website for direct access and publication of the Swedish police's most visited website*
- *Monthly newsletters*
- *2 (Two) conferences in Stockholm*
- *A series of seminars and workshops*
- *Lectures and presentations, both internally and externally*
- *Participation in the public debate by writing articles, giving interviews etc.*
- *Manual on how to tackle and prevent criminal gangs*

2.7.1 Surveying criminal gangs in Sweden

The objective of the project could be interpreted that SGIP was to survey the criminal gangs existing in Sweden during the project period. Although this was not explicitly stated in the project application, the project group was, however, in agreement that that the work was to focus on street gangs and not motorcycle gangs or other types of gang. This is not made clear in the project application. Nor is it always clear from SGIP's reports. There is a risk of getting the impression that the SGIP project focused on criminal gangs as a general phenomenon and not just on street gangs.

The SGIP project management team states that seven gangs were surveyed during SGIP, which has constituted the basis for a scientific article (Rostami et al, 2012). There are street gangs that have not been surveyed, e.g., in Östergötland and Uppsala. According to the project management team, this is because SGIP had no data about these gangs. The project management team states that there are obviously more local gangs that have not been surveyed. According to the project management team, those selected are of national importance, but it has not been possible to establish exactly what is meant by this. According to the project management team, when collecting data SGIP has approached the National Criminal Investigation Department at the Police Authorities in Gothenburg, Malmö and Stockholm to get information about gangs that are not motorcycle gangs. Project management has not presented the reasons why SGIP did not survey additional street gangs by asking other police authorities. It should be noted that the Lima initiative targeted a motorcycle gang that SGIP defined as a street gang. It has not been explained how SGIP ensured that gangs perceived by others as motorcycle gangs but that, according to SGIP's definition would not be regarded as street gangs, were not lost while collecting data. SGIP's project management team feels that this project objective has been achieved. The evaluators have only been given access to a limited amount of information concerning the surveying work, and has impacted on our ability to confirm that the project objective has been achieved. We were able to gain some insight into the mapping work because one of us was involved in helping to collect some of the data used for a scientific article.

To sum up, SGIP has surveyed certain criminal gangs in Sweden. Several criminal gangs have not been surveyed. The evaluation has largely not been able to verify whether the quality of the seven surveys carried out reached an acceptable level.

2.7.2 Creating an intelligence and investigation register (Special Investigation Register)

This project objective has been achieved.

During SGIP's first year, an intelligence and investigation register (Special Investigation Register) was created called Södertörn's GÄNGSUR. The technical basis for this is iBase. Tips and other relevant information are registered in this database. According to the SGIP project leader, there are several thousand pieces of information in this database. It has not been part of this assignment to evaluate how much the Special Investigation Register has been used, its structure and what use different stakeholders have had for this register.

2.7.3 Prosecute 25% of strategic gang members

Firstly, there are grounds to discuss the term "strategic gang member". If the project has defined a particular person as strategic, is this person, by definition, a strategic gang member or is it part of the evaluation work to carry out an analysis of the different gangs? That is to say, does the work of evaluation initially involve evaluating whether the project has chosen the right individuals and then an analysis of whether these strategic persons have been prosecuted? The way the objective is currently expressed is that it will be achieved if only 25% of them are prosecuted. It is probably the case that the objective implicitly includes the term "at least". Nor does the term "prosecuted" say anything about the seriousness of the crime. For example, it is worth mentioning that if a gang member is encountered not wearing a seat belt, the present wording means this will be included when considering whether the objective is achieved. Another matter that should also be highlighted is that even though SGIP has not played any part in a certain individual being prosecuted, the objective can be regarded as achieved. However, we interpret the objective in such a way that it is SGIP's performance that is to be evaluated and that a very minor offence should not be included.

There is no account of how the figure of 25% has been arrived at. This gives the impression that it was pulled out of thin air. Knowledge of the total group of "strategic gang members" is required in order to be able to set a realistic objective. There was no such inventory when the objective was formulated. A list of the strategic persons on whom the work was supposed to focus was to be drawn up later in the project. SGIP decided to target a certain gang during the period only to then change its focus. A gang is surveyed prior to each initiative. If this work is less successful and the work of targeting a certain gang is thereby extended, surveying the next gang is delayed. In short, the evaluation work becomes dependent on the outcome of the project in order to assess the outcome of the project. Naturally, this is problematic. If the strategic persons had been defined by SGIP from the outset, the conditions for evaluating the project would be completely different. In addition, the information we have received about the analysis and selection of gang members and the outcome of the work has been insufficient to carry out an evaluation. The project management team has stated that they do not have the information requested. The project managers feel they have achieved the objective set but state that this type of objective is not suitable for this type of project. They feel that an objective like this measures the wrong things. The project management teams emphasises that the most important thing is not the gang member being prosecuted but leaving the gang.

SGIP has not been able to confirm sufficiently clearly that the objective has been achieved.

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Taking the above argument into account, even conducting a discussion on whether the objective has been achieved is also problematic. The conditions for this have been far too vague.

2.7.4 To reduce the number of gang members and gangs in Södertörn Police District by 25%

To some extent the same problems apply to this point as for the previous point.

Is it the gangs and gang members SGIP has identified on which the evaluation should be based, or should gangs and gang members be defined by the evaluators? There has been no presentation of the total number of gangs and gang members to the evaluators and in this case too, the data to which we have been given access regarding the outcome of the work has also been insufficient to enable an analysis to be performed. Another problem regarding the expected results as formulated above is how the word "and" is used. The expression means that even if SGIP was to succeed in substantially reducing the number of gang members this point can be regarded as not achieved if there is still the same number of gangs. Another difficulty is deciding when an individual should be regarded as no longer belonging to a gang. For example, the fact that a person ends up in prison does not automatically mean that the person is no longer a gang member. The project management team considers this objective to have been achieved.

SGIP has not been able to confirm sufficiently clearly that the objective has been achieved and it is consequently also problematic in this case to even assess whether the objective has been achieved bearing in mind how the objective has been worded.

2.7.5 120+50 hours training for police officers and 50 hours training for police cadets.

This expected result is clear with regard to the number of hours but there is no account of which police officers or police cadets are to receive this training - is it all police officers and police cadets in Sweden, or just some?

SGIP has given presentations to police officers and police cadets. According to the project management team, this project objective has been achieved. However, the data to which the evaluators have been given access does not demonstrate that the project has achieved the objective set.

2.7.6 Nine (9) seminars with project partners in Denmark, the UK and Norway to exchange experiences and knowledge

SGIP has visited all its partners, but the accounts of the trips give the impression that it was more a case of study visits than seminars. There is no description of whether the project has held seminars in Sweden with its partners.

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The project management team feels that this objective has been achieved. However, the data to which the evaluators have been given access does not support the suggestion that the project has achieved its objective of holding nine seminars with its partners in Denmark, the UK and Norway.

2.7.7 Disseminate knowledge about SGI and its methods and procedures for initiatives at two (2) conferences and seminars

This project objective has probably been achieved. Two conferences have been held where SGI's methods have been presented but the substance and wording of the objective is unclear regarding the seminars.

2.7.8 Illustrate SGI's positive experiences and best practices and its methods, e.g., protecting and supporting victims of crime and witnesses

Since this point has been specifically emphasised, we have interpreted this as involving dissemination of information in addition to what is stated in the other project objectives. From the material to which the investigators have been given access, it is not possible to confirm that SGIP has specifically described how, for example, they will be able to protect and support victims of crime and witnesses by virtue of, for example, positive experiences and methods. This is due to a limited empirical foundation (see also chapter 8)

2.7.9 Develop a complete and effective guide that can be implemented locally, regionally and nationally by the member states

The social phenomenon the project aims to tackle is complex. The objective of creating a guide during the project that is complete and effective and that can also be implemented in all the EU member states must be regarded as unrealistic. The project has not succeeded in achieving this objective. There are, on the other hand, phenomena and conditions illustrated in the project that could be valuable for other countries to examine in their work to combat gang crime.

In the concluding words in the manual, the SGIP project manager also discusses the fact that the project has not succeeded in developing a complete and effective guide for tackling gang problems:

> *"We do not claim the Panther model is a solution to this problem. It should instead be seen as a starting point ... in tackling the increasing problem of gangs in Sweden and Europe" (page 324)*

2.7.10 Create a platform and knowledge base for cooperation and exchange of information and experiences between crime-prevention organisations in the EU.

Interviews with the project management team at SGIP revealed that they had collaborated with researchers in Europe and also with a number of crime-prevention organisations. The project management team considers this to be an important step in developing the work of combating gangs and that the intention is to continue this cooperation in a new EU project. The project management team's statements have been interpreted as SGIP having taken an important initial step towards facilitating an increased exchange of information concerning gang crime within the EU. The evaluation has been based on the wording of the project objectives. If the wordings of the objectives had been different, the conditions would have been studied and highlighted differently in this report. The data to which the evaluators have been given access does not confirm that the objective "*Create a platform and a knowledge base*" has been achieved. There has been no evaluation of whether SGIP has taken an important step towards facilitating an increased exchange of information on gang crime within the EU.

2.7.11 Paper presentations and posters to support the dissemination of the project's activities

This project objective has probably been achieved.

The SGIP project management team have stated that this material has been printed but the evaluators have not been given access to material that confirms whether and to what extent this has taken place.

2.7.12 A project website for direct access and publication of the Swedish police's most visited website

A project website was created at the start of SGIP. The website was shut down while the evaluation was being carried out and the project had not yet been concluded. To what extent the information on this website was topical and how often it has shut down was not stated during the evaluation. Nor was it stated how often SGIP published information on the police's website.

2.7.13 Monthly newsletters

Information has been disseminated in the project but not in the form of a monthly newsletter issued each month. Information has been disseminated quarterly in something called SGI news and gang information.

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2.7.14 2 (Two) conferences in Stockholm

This project objective has been achieved.

2.7.15 A series of seminars and workshops

Various forms of information exchange have taken place in various contexts. The SGIP project management team feels that this objective has been achieved but the evaluators have not been given access to data to confirm that a series of seminars and workshops have been held.

2.7.16 Lectures and presentations, both internally and externally

This project objective has been achieved.

Lectures and presentations have been delivered in various contexts, both internally and externally. Several interviews indicate that the presentations were perceived as interesting and professional. The speakers have illustrated valuable aspects and the messages have been viewed as well-structured.

2.7.17 Participation in the public debate by writing articles, giving interviews etc.

This project objective has been achieved.

SGIP has figured in several contexts in the public debate: through statements in the media, an opinion piece in a national newspaper and through different kinds of statements in other contexts.

2.7.18 Manual about how to tackle and prevent criminal gangs

A relatively comprehensive anthology with an expensive layout has been produced: "The Stockholm Gang Model PANTHER". The term "manual" can have different meanings, e.g., a brief handbook or a reference work. The document produced is not of such a nature that it can act as a manual in the sense of a concise "handbook". The design of the manual makes it difficult to read and navigate, for example, there are no page references to the subheadings in the list of contents. There are a small number of points in the table of contents that a reader can look up directly. The pictures in the manual are often interspersed in the text and the text is compressed, making it difficult to read. Moreover, the pictures in the manual rarely have any actual connection to the sections and the captions have usually been omitted (see, for example, pages 242, 244, 246, 251, 252 and 255). A reader is thus not able to use the pictures as a support in navigating around the manual or to get a quick idea of what is discussed in a certain section.

Many sections in the manual concern reporting on what different theories say and include narratives about what has happened in the project but rarely concern themselves with

conveying concrete advice that can be applied. The theoretical sections are described relatively independently without any link to the model. There is very little about the argumentation and reasons presented for different decisions when producing the model. It is generally difficult to find solid, concrete advice in the manual about how work combating gang crime should be organised. In addition, the sections of the manual based on SGIP's experiences have little empirical basis (see also chapter 8). In terms of scope, the manual is more like a reference work, but lacks the breadth and depth usually associated with such a work. The book can be better described as a conceptual document.

2.7.19 Summary of the project objectives

The list below is based on the data to which the evaluators have been given access, and the evaluators' interpretation of the significance of each objective.

Objective	Objective achieved	Objective probably achieved	Comments
1. To survey criminal gangs in Sweden			The wording of the objective is unclear
2. To create an intelligence and investigation register (Special Investigation Register)	x		
3. To prosecute 25% of strategic gang members			The wording of the objective is problematic
4. To reduce the number of gang members and gangs in Södertörn Police District by 25%			The wording of the objective is problematic
5. 120+50 hours training for police officers and 50 hours training for police cadets			
6. Nine (9) seminars with project partners in Denmark, the UK and Norway to exchange experiences and knowledge.			
7. Disseminate knowledge about SGI and its methods and procedures in initiatives at two (2) conferences and seminars		x	The wording of the objective is unclear
8. Illustrate SGI's good experiences and best practices and its methods, e.g., protecting and supporting victims of crime and witnesses			
9. To develop a complete and effective guide that can be implemented locally, regionally and nationally by the member states.			The wording of the objective is unrealistic

10. Create a platform and knowledge base for cooperation and exchanging information and experiences between crime-prevention organisations in the EU.			The wording of the objective is unclear
11. Paper presentations and posters to support the dissemination of the project's activities		x	
12. A project website for direct access and publication of the Swedish police's most visited website			
13. Monthly newsletters			
14. 2 (Two) conferences in Stockholm	x		
15. A series of seminars and workshops			
16. Lectures and presentations, both internally and externally	x		
17. Taking part in the public debate by writing articles, giving interviews etc.	x		
18. Manual on how to tackle and prevent criminal gangs			

3. Analysis of the Panther model

The panther model is described as a holistic model for combating street gangs and is based on problem-oriented policing. The basic philosophy is that a network analysis should act as the basis for how to tackle gangs. The different steps in the Panther model are illustrated in Figure 1 below. The task begins with preliminary work and an analysis phase. The choice of method is subsequently followed by operational initiatives. The focus is then on investigation and instituting criminal proceedings. The penultimate phase concerns convicting individuals and the final phase concerns evaluating the outcome. Throughout the entire process, the aim is to get a number of individuals to leave the gangs. In order to succeed in this, social initiative groups (SIGs) are also used. The work of the criminal investigation service also plays a key role in the Panther model. The idea is that there should also be comprehensive cooperation with other authorities through the local intelligence centres (LUCs).


Figure 1: Outline illustration of Panther (Described during presentations in several contexts, also first page of SGI Annual Report 2011)

3.1 The Panther model's link to other research

3.1.1 HOP - an alternative to POP?

During interviews and in other contexts, SGIP's project manager has claimed that, as a result of what is called "holistic" oriented policing (HOP), the Panther model is an alternative to problem-oriented policing (POP). During the course of the evaluation, the evaluators have questioned this attitude and it has been suggested that SGIP should instead use research on problem-oriented policing as the basis when explaining their working methods.

Since the manual about the Panther model was finally published, there has been a change in the approach to problem-oriented policing. The back of the book contains the text: *"The Panther model is based on the paradigm of problem-oriented policing*". Problem-oriented policing is briefly described (see pages 66-69) in the chapter, "*Some Theoretical Influences on PANTHER*" It is not, however, explained in any detail how the Panther model has been developed on the basis of this approach. When the development of the Panther model is described later in the book, it is mentioned very briefly (see page 112) that the basic model is based on a modified version of SARA (SARA describes in general terms the different stages in conducting problem-oriented policing) and NIM (the National Intelligence Model, an intelligence model from the UK). There is no description in the manual of the way in which SARA and NIM have been modified and why they have been modified Nor is there a discussion of how things have proceeded since they were integrated. The fact that other police "tools" and processes such as COMPSTAT (page 75) and ETI (page 76) are said to be part of the Panther model does not make it any easier to understand how the various fundamental pillars of the model are connected.

The working methods at SGI that constitute the basis of the Panther model have been produced using an inductive approach. It is not until later in the process that an attempt has been made to develop the working methods and establish the method by linking it to research carried out previously. Our interpretation is that it would have been possible to go much further in establishing this, primarily with regard to the possibility of using problem-oriented policing as the basis and, in particular, the experiences gained when applying POP against criminal gangs. Problem-oriented policing can be described as a form of action-based research where a problem and its obvious causes are defined and a holistic approach is taken in order to research solutions and take action that could eliminate or reduce the problem - followed by an evaluation to investigate the extent to which there has been an impact on the problem (see Goldstein, 1979-1990).

The manual states (see page 324) that SGIP's ambitions resulted in HOP ("holistic" oriented policing) and the implementation of the Panther model. It claims that HOP includes POP (problem-oriented policing) and other materials (see page 13). There are no references to HOP in the chapter where the different influences on the Panther model are enumerated. It is consequently somewhat unclear as to what sources the authors cite for HOP. The importance of acting holistically is mentioned in a number of places in the manual. However, it is difficult to see that the holistic philosophy emphasised in the Panther model is anything new that cannot be found in POP. There are, for example, a large number of hits for the word "holistic" if you do a search at www.popcenter.org, the website for problem-oriented policing. The

problems described on this website can refer to anything from the increase in criminal gangs to the protection of endangered animals. POP is all about an attitude. Various customised procedures for tackling the different problems are applied within the framework of POP.

Tackling certain problems requires a number of factors to be taken into account and influenced, usually with a high level of cooperation with different parties. A large number of POP projects have been implemented focusing on criminal gangs and the different problems arising from them (see, for example, Redondo Beach Police Department 1996; Boston Police department, 1998; Fontana Police Department 2001; Pasadena Police Department 2001; Halton Regional Police Service 2002; Bullock & Tilley, 2002; Braga et al, 2003; Los Angeles Police Department 2002; 2007; 2009; Department of Public Safety, New York, 2008; Greater Manchester Police 2009; Anaheim police department, 2009; 2010; Roseville Police Department 2010; South Yorkshire Police 2010; Metropolitan police 2010; 2011; San Diego Police Department 2011). All of these use the SARA process and have endeavoured to produce solutions tailored to the types of problem to which gangs give rise.

SGIP could have applied POP instead of expending energy on attempting to create a model of its own. Since its ambition was to produce a model of its own, Panther, it needs to explain and justify its choice of method and why it feels that its solution is better than the general POP model.

One example of this is that the Panther model focuses on an individual's allegiance to a gang. In this context, network analyses are an important aid, with various forms of social prevention presented as one among many measures. However, researchers with a strong background in problem-oriented policing, e.g., Bullock and Tilly, believe that it may be more effective to tackle certain types of violent behaviour rather than focusing on individuals' gang allegiances. They have analysed gang projects and point out that what is perhaps the most successful gang project, the Boston Project, Cease Fire, did not include the underlying social conditions that may constitute the breeding ground for gangs. Instead the focus was on achieving a quick, sustainable result aimed at reducing the number of people injured and killed by shootings (Bullock & Tilly, 2008). The questions arising as a result of the choice of methods in the Panther model are not explained. It will, therefore, be difficult for a reader to view the Panther model with its "holistic" approach (HOP) as a new achievement.

The actual basic idea behind problem-oriented policing is not particularly revolutionary, but there is a great difference between this and traditional police methods such as monitoring vehicles, foot patrols or organising work in a particular way, for example, through local police or police office activity (see also Holgersson, 2008, pages 23-38, Weisburd & Eck, 2004).

Problem-oriented policing has not been given a particularly prominent role in the Swedish police and several researchers stress that police organisations do not have the capacity to implement new ways of working (Brodeur, 1998; McElroy, 1998; Knutsson, 2003; Holgersson & Knutsson, 2008). SGIP's work could contribute towards illustrating the fact that traditional police working methods are not effective in tackling gang crime. The importance of performing an analysis prior to the police carrying out an initiative is something that is stressed by the SGIP project management team. This is illustrated in the manual and has emerged during various oral reports. It is very important to influence the police to try to perform well-founded analyses before an initiative is implemented (see also Holgersson, 2008).

To sum up, the Panther model exemplifies important components in the police work involving gangs. A broad approach like this comes within the framework of problem-oriented policing, for which there is a strong basis. It would, therefore, have been beneficial if SGIP had based its work to a greater extent on experiences of problem-oriented policing. There is actually a full, varied and widely available literature associated with this philosophy, which is particularly adapted to practitioners and academics with the focus on applied research. A large portion of this literature can be downloaded from the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing's website – www.popcenter.org. A search for the term, "gang", for example, gives about 1,200 hits.

3.1.2 Different approaches depending on the type of gang and focusing initiatives on key individuals

A basic philosophy of the Panther model is that the police cannot tackle all types of gang in the same way and need to choose a strategy depending on the type of gang involved. What support is available for this method? It has been clear from interviews that the project has derived a great deal of inspiration from Klein's research. Klein (1995) divides gangs according to their characteristics, such as street gangs, drug gangs, prison gangs and motorcycle gangs. When it came to street gangs, he discerned five different types of grouping, for example, the compact gang, which consists of small groups of people of the same age and which exists for a short period, and the specialised gang that focuses on a special type of crime within a clearly defined territory. Klein believes that some types of police intervention may strengthen certain gangs, while other types may weaken other gangs. According to Klein, it is therefore important that the police take into account the types of gang they are dealing with before taking action against them. (Klein, 1995). There is extensive research on gangs and it is outside the framework of this evaluation to carry out a thorough analysis of it. Instead we will simply state that Klein is a gang researcher with a very good reputation and that there is a great deal of support for SGIP's basic philosophy about gangs in this research.

An important principle in SGIP's model is focusing work on strategic persons in a gang and individually adapting measures against them. According to the Panther model, doing this requires gangs and their leading figures to be surveyed. Support for this kind of strategy can be found in McGloin's (2005) research. She studied street gangs in Newark and was able to establish that they were loosely constituted and that certain strategic persons formed the hub of the gang structure. She also felt that this was something that should be taken into account when police carry out interventions against gangs (McGloin, 2005). Although no reference is made to the National Criminal Investigation Department's KAP model in presentation of SGIP's model, clear parallels can be drawn with it. The KAP model also involves analysing networks and targeting action against strategic persons (The National Criminal Investigation Department, 2010).

The police's measures against leading figures in gangs plays a prominent role in the Panther model. The importance of leading figures when it comes to how a gang acts can be found in research such as Short & Strodtbeck (1966), Porter and Alison (2005) and Fortune (2003). SGIP contributes to an increased understanding of criminal gangs by describing a number of ideal-typical categories of different leader types and appropriate philosophies for combating them. The ideal-typical categories that SGIP identifies are:

– The Entrepreneur
– The Prophet
– The Realist
– The Social Victim

The manual states that these categories are taken from sociological and criminological research (Merton, 1938; Matza, 1964; Jankowski, 1991 and Brotherton & Barrios 2004).

It could have been advantageous to have also derived some benefit from general new research on leadership during the project. Extensive research is available on leadership. This research was previously often based on ideal-typical descriptions of different types of leader only to then proceed to further stressing the importance of the concept for leadership (see, for example, Coleman & Early, 2004; Bruzelius & Skärvad, 2012; Alvesson & Spicer, 2012). Support in theories such as this would have made it easier to establish an increased insight into how different gang leaders can be tackled, for example, depending on which developmental phase the gang is going through. It should be noted that a distinction can be made between a key figure in a gang and a leader. The SGIP model illustrates the importance of taking action against the gangs' leaders. Extensive space is devoted to this in the manual. The fact that key figures may be individuals other than leaders is dealt with very briefly in the manual.

To sum up, our assessment is that there is good theoretical support in SGIP's model when it comes to taking into account what type of gang is involved, and before taking an initiative and targeting actions against strategic persons in the gang.

3.1.3 Local Intelligence Centres (LUCs)

As described in chapter 1, Local Intelligence Centres involve actors from different authorities sharing information and working together in order to tackle serious organised crime. The figure in the manual (page 115) shows that Local Intelligence Centres have links to the surveying and analysis phase, not to any other phase. It is, however, possible to deduce from the text of the manual that Local Intelligence Centres are also linked to the investigation phase as regards accessing the proceeds of crime. When the Panther model has been illustrated in other contexts (see, for example, figure 1) there has been a link to the operational initiatives. It is not clear why this link has been removed in the diagram in the manual.

The manual points to research showing that collaboration between different actors is an important key to success in tackling gangs and establishing preventive programmes. Reference is made to McCluskey & Carnochan (2011) and the Home Office (2011). There is a brief description in the manual of how this cooperation should take place. The work performed in the local intelligence centres has already been discussed in the first chapter of this report. This work mainly involves accessing criminals' proceeds from crime.

To sum up, there is substantial support in research to suggest that the conditions are favourable for involving other stakeholders in order to address gang problems. This is one of the fundamental ideas behind the Local Intelligence Centres but how this is to be done in practice is largely left unexplained in the descriptions of the Panther model.

3.1.4 Social Initiative Groups (SIGs)

In the diagram of the model, the Social Initiative Groups (SIGs) are included as a component. It has been stated in interviews that an official report (SOU:2010:15) forms the basis for this component (see also the statement in SvD 25/9/2011). When social initiative groups are presented in the manual, reference is made to the above report. Having reviewed the report (SoU 2010:15), it seems, however, that it does not make clear how social initiative groups should work in practice. How is a young man moving in Black Cobra circles to be motivated to work in the afternoons in an old people's home? If he decides voluntarily to perform these duties instead of spending time with his friends, then it is perhaps possible by definition to state that this person does not belong to a risk group?

The official report deals to some extent with the need to motivate young people by, among other things, pointing to the lessons learned from the so-called Boston Project where the information meetings were important from a motivational point of view. David Kennedy, who ran the Boston Project's research team, stresses the importance of putting pressure on central individuals to induce them to relinquish their criminal behaviour (Kennedy et al 1996: Kennedy, 2001). There has to be a credible threat of substantial punishment if they continue with their criminal actions. They are informed that their identities are known and that the most minor of offences will lead to a severe sentence. However, if they stop, the authorities are prepared to assist with various initiatives in the form or training, work etc. A number of different organisations, such as the Probation Service, social services and church organisations based their work on an overall picture of the problem and contributed measures in their respective area of activity (see Boston Police Department, 1998).

However, there is a great difference between Sweden and the USA as regards how the authorities generate this kind of pressure. Sweden does not have the wide scope for discretion that exists in the USA. A clear example of when the police applied this focused deterrent in a problem-oriented project is when young people were invited to a meeting along with their parents, and police and prosecutors presented clear evidence, e.g., photographs showing that the young people had been involved in selling drugs. A full preliminary investigation lacking only the signature of the prosecutor does not have to be put into effect, but can be used as pressure. The young people realise that the preliminary investigation will be actioned, resulting in a serious punishment if they do not give up their criminal activity. However, if they do give up, support is available to them in various ways (High Point Police Department, 2006). The problem not discussed in the official report is how to exert strong pressure like this within the framework of the Swedish system, which has very little scope for this due to legal principles. The opportunity to apply similar methods in Sweden is not sufficiently analysed. The fundamental theoretical starting point with a credibly focused deterrent is described very vaguely in the report. The follow-up on the implementation of social initiative groups in Stockholm County states that the identification of the above problem is highly relevant. The front page of the follow up illustrates this motivational problem with a quote from a 15-year old boy, which it is also included in this summary:

> *"The quote on the front of the report is from a boy who had previously been involved in a number of the social services' voluntary and less voluntary initiatives and who has been offered a social initiative group. The boy demonstrates the challenge in motivational work: "but I want you to tell me then in what way this is good for me" (Vainik, 2012, page 19).*

According to the directive, the report's (SOU 2010:15) proposals should be formulated on the basis of work already conducted. Different initiatives in the Stockholm police are illustrated in the report and appear to be important components in the proposals presented. As the Stockholm Police's way of presenting different activities has, in many cases, proved to be different from how they work in reality (see Holgersson, 2013) there are grounds for questioning the proposals in the official report.

To sum up, the components of the Panther model that are based on proposals from the official report, SOU 2010:15, are not well founded in research.

3.1.5 The scanning and analysis phase

Before presenting the Panther process in the manual, the claim is made that it utilises, among other things, a modified version of SARA (see page 112). The SARA process is, however, only briefly described in the manual (see page 68). There is no description of why the authors feel that the SARA process has to be modified. There are no references to either SARA or problem-oriented policing under the scanning and analysis heading. Descriptions in the manual of how scanning and analysis should proceed are brief. Problem-oriented policing includes extensive descriptions of how scanning and analysis should proceed (see, for example, the 55-point programme, RPS). Links are made to theory in the sections describing social network analysis. With the exception of one case, there are no other references to literature describing how scanning and analysis should proceed.

In the model presented in the manual, there is no heading for analysis of the external environment (see pages 115 and figure 2 below). This has been included in earlier presentations of the model (see figure 1).

Figure 2. Extracts from the manual (page 115)

There is no description in the manual of what constitutes the basis for the choice of headings in the model. It is also unclear how they are linked. In a circle in the upper part of the model, the choice has been made to put this at actor-level, highlighting the Tax Authority, the Prison Service and the Public Prosecution Authority. In a circle in the lower part of the model, the choice has been made to highlight the intelligence unit (named the criminal investigation service in figure 1) and then apply an activity level that involves, among other things, identifying strategic persons/targets, determining what type of gang is involved and performing a strategic and tactical analysis.

The manual states, and this is also indicated during interviews and presentations, that information from other actors should be used when, for example, strategic and tactical analyses are to be performed. To judge from the model, however, there is no such link between the actors in the upper circle and the activities in the lower circle apart from an arrow to the scanning and analysis box. In the circle in the upper part of the model, there are only arrows between some actors and the information appears to go in a loop. The numbering goes in one direction and the arrows in another. The arrows in the circle in the lower part of the model go from the respective activity to the intelligence unit. The relationship and connection between the respective activities are not described in the model.

When the different activities are discussed in the text (pages 116 ff.) the same headings[12] are not used as those in the description of the model on page 115 of the manual (see figure 2). One heading in the model: "*Decide on media strategy*" is not discussed at all in the chapter on the Panther model. There is a reference to a later chapter and it is difficult to see the logic in the point *decide on media strategy* referring to the scanning and analysis stage. It would be more logical to connect this point to method selection and tactical operations. The chapter on media management is also in fact called "*Communication Strategies in Policing Operation*s". This chapter is formulated more like a manual than other chapters in the manual. The chapter employs a general perspective and does not apply specifically to the Panther model. The chapter has no references at all.

With regard to the explanation of the Panther model's scanning and analysis stages, there is only one activity that is given the same heading in the diagram describing the model as in the subsequent text. This is point 7: "*Strategic and Tactical Analysis*." Other points have a different name in the subsequent text. Moreover, there is a heading in the explanatory text that is not described in the diagram describing the model. This heading is "*Using Social Network analysis to track gang development*".

To sum up, the description in the manual is weak regarding how work during the scanning and analysis stage should proceed. It is therefore difficult to say whether support can be found for the structure of the work in the various approaches. There is only support to be found in the following argument for a small number of the headings and there are differences in the diagram of the model compared with the arrangement of the subsequent text.

3.1.6 The method selection and operational work phases

The method selection and operational work phases in the Panther model are briefly described under the same heading. Why it has been decided to describe the different stages in the very same chapter is not explained. In addition, it is unclear which parts of the chapter deal with which stage of the model. Different arguments and issues are muddled in the chapter. For example, it states that it is good to receive information from the public in order to ascertain whether there is a problem with gangs in a certain area. This question probably belongs in the chapter dealing with the scanning and analysis stages and should only arise when method selection and operational initiatives are performed. It is unclear what general steps and concrete approaches are included in the Panther model's method selection and operational work. Due to the way the chapter is formulated, it is difficult to ascertain where support for the choices derives from. The authors themselves have contributed to the reference that is provided describing leader types. Apart from this, there are absolutely no references. The authors use the expression, "we believe" with regard to how the gangs should be tackled. It would have been of benefit to have been able to reinforce their opinions through a link to one or more works.

To sum up, the report in the manual on how method selection and operational work should proceed according to the model is unclear, very brief and not supported by literature.

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[12] Point 1: "*Social Network Analysis*" and point 3 "*Identify Strategic Persons/Targets*" are described under the heading: "*Social Network Analysis*: *Finding Strategic Individuals*". Point 2 "*Determine type of gang*" and point 4: "*Develop appropriate paradigm*" are discussed under the heading: "*Determine Type of gang and developing appropriate response paradigms*". Point 6: "*Conduct background checks on key individuals/Corps*" is dealt with under the heading "*Backgrounds check*".

3.1.7 The investigation phase

The description of the Panther model's investigation stage refers to and discusses a large number of sources. Some of these discussions mention the Panther model . In others, it is difficult to see the link to the Panther model, e.g., the section "*Problems with Using a "Confession Focus*" (see page 129).

Furthermore, this section is extensive compared with a number of other sections. For example, one section mentions that the Panther model's investigation philosophy is based on a modification of the so-called Peace model. There is no explanation of why it has been necessary to modify the Peace model or how the model has been modified (see page 133). The authors also state that they used Christiansson et al's research as their starting point when formulating how to conduct questioning, and state that this approach largely concurs with the Peace model (see page 133). There is no specification of what the models have in common and how they differ. If they largely agree with each other, it is also possible to ask why the authors have chosen to discuss them in different sections when the Panther model is described. It may be difficult for the reader when both overlapping and non-overlapping models are linked to different recommended approaches throughout the entire text. Consequently, even if the text contains a lot of examples of what is included in the Panther model's investigation stage, it may be difficult to get an overall idea of how the different parts are connected.

The fact that the terms "method" and "model" are not used consistently throughout the manual also makes understanding more difficult. When they refer to "model", the authors frequently mean a descriptive outline illustration while "method" often refers to a concrete approach (e.g., page 113). The authors sometimes use these and other terms as if they were synonyms, however, see point three of the evaluation task for example, "*How the exchange of knowledge has been important for the development of the SGI method*". Another example of when "method" takes on a slightly different meaning is when the authors write that they are convinced that the key to a successful result is dealing with gang members humanely, and not viewing them as hardened criminals. They believe that it is undesirable to have the attitude that the only solution is to "lock them up and throw away the key". The authors state that they have had positive experiences of "following this method" (see page 134). Here, "method" is used more in the sense of adopting a certain attitude.

To sum up, a large number of sources are referred to in the Panther model's investigation stage. Based on the text in the manual, however, it may be difficult to get a clear holistic view of how different elements of the investigation stage are connected. Compared with the SARA process, the Response phase has been omitted/replaced in the Panther model. It is unclear why this has happened. It could possibly be the case that the method selection, operational work and investigation phases are regarded as so specific that they will always be present in the application of the Panther model.

3.1.8 The evaluation phase

The panther model's five basic components are described in the form of a process. The last part of the process consists of the evaluation stage. The figure in the manual shows that the results of the evaluation are traced back to the scanning and analysis stage. There are no arrows to or from any part of the Panther model (see page 151). The reasoning in the manual

about the manner of following up the operational initiatives (see page 152) and the reference to Clarke and Eck do not concur with this figure.

The description of the evaluation stage is based on a reference to step 46 in Clarke and Eck's (2005) 60-step model. When producing this model, Clarke and Eck endeavoured to produce a concise text in order to explain each step in the model. There are a number of documents that describe in more detail how an evaluation can be carried out in accordance with POP. There are, however, no other references under the evaluation stage heading in the manual other than to step 46 in Clarke and Eck's 60-step model.

The explanation of what is included in the evaluation stage is very concise. A figure from Clarke and Eck's work is presented without any explanation (see page 152). A large part of the text under the evaluation stage heading is a general description of some reasons why problem-oriented solutions do not function or have no effect. There is no detailed explanation of why this text is shown under the evaluation stage.

To sum up, the description of the Panther model's evaluation stage is so brief that it is difficult to get an idea of what is included in the model. There is indeed a reference to evaluation work in accordance with problem-oriented policing, but since the Panther model lays claim to be a new concept (see, for example, page 13), it is necessary to explain the evaluation procedure in accordance with the Panther model. It is not enough, therefore, to simply make a reference to 1 of 60 steps in another work to explain the evaluation stage. In view of the fact that the book claims to act as guidance, the fact that the section dealing with the evaluation phase is so incomplete and concise is problematic. One of the cornerstones of problem-oriented policing is that it must be evidence-based (Bullock & Tilley, 2009). The manual states that the evaluation factor is often weak in problem-oriented projects (page 151). This is due to the fact that this is a complicated factor that requires good methodology skills (Scott, 2000; 2006; Knutsson, 2009). Guidance is readily available on how the evaluation should be conducted in problem-oriented projects (Eck, 2002). The question could also be asked why no reference is made to this type of literature and why the evaluation of the Panther model is so inadequate? There is also a complication that it is worth highlighting; i.e., those cases where an evaluation indicates that the measures taken have not been effective. This can lead to pressure on project employees to ensure in different ways that it "looks like" the measures have actually been effective since their managers want "positive" results that they can use in their presentation of the activity (Knutsson, 2012; Holgersson, 2013).

3.1.9 Theories and methods used in other types of organisation

As previously mentioned, the basic idea behind SGIP's model is to target strategic individuals. A parallel can be drawn with vulnerability analyses carried out in other organisations where key figures are identified. In this case, however, the aim is the opposite. It involves reducing vulnerability through different types of measure. In terms of the police's work to combat criminal organisations, this instead involves exploiting vulnerability in order to weaken the organisations.

There is extensive general research on different forms of organisational development and experiences gained from applying different methods in companies. In addition to vulnerability analyses, another example worth mentioning is process mapping. The idea behind this is to map the processes in an organisation so that they can be developed. In terms of the police's work to combat criminal organisations, it would be possible to use process maps to identify

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important processes and gain an idea of how a particular organisation could be damaged by attacking sensitive parts of their central processes. In principle, it could also be possible to employ an approach that aims to bring about small continual improvements in an organisation (QTM, see, for example, Rentzhog, 1998) in a reverse fashion. In other words, the police acting with a view to causing continuous minor damage to a criminal organisation. Analysing where benefit could be derived from organisational research when developing work to combat criminal organisations falls outside the remit of this evaluation.

To sum up, it has been established that it is possible to find support for, and also develop, SGIP's fundamental ideas on the basis of theories used in implementing change in organisations. In organisations, processes of change have the aim of moving organisations in a positive direction. When the police act against criminal organisations, the aim is the opposite, i.e. trying to make criminal organisations operate as ineffectively as possible and develop negatively.

3.1.10 The SGIP model focuses on tackling an organisation - not problems in an area

The Panther model focuses on tackling an organisation. The need to take an overall view of a particular geographic area is not made explicit in the model. POP projects combating criminal gangs, as exemplified in this report, have focused on getting to grips with problems within a certain area (e.g., Boston Police department, 1998; Bullock & Tilley, 2002 and Metropolitan police 2011).

Focusing on all gangs simultaneously can be problematic. As the Panther model does not clarify the need to coordinate initiatives within a certain area, there is a risk that using the Panther model will disadvantage a certain gang in an area and benefit the activities of another gang in the same area. If, for example, there are two competing gangs selling drugs in an area and the police focus their action against one of the gangs, there is a risk of the other gang taking over market shares. Tackling the selling of drugs in an area requires initiatives to be focused in time and space (see, for example, Holgersson & Knutsson, 2011), which is not illustrated in the Panther model.

To sum up, it can be said that the Panther model needs to clarify the need to take an overview of a particular geographical area in connection with tackling certain types of gang.

3.1.11 Overall arguments concerning shortcomings in the theoretical support for the Panther model

Traditional policing methods such as monitoring vehicles have proven to be ineffective over a long period, (see, for example, Kelling et al, 1974; see also Holgersson, 2008). However, police organisations are finding it difficult to adopt new ways of working (see, for example, Brodeur, 1998; McElroy, 1998; Holgersson & Knutsson, 2008). One of the basic attitudes within SGIP has been that there is a major need to change the police's traditional ways of working. There is extensive theoretical support for this perception (see also the above-mentioned references). What SGIP stresses is that analysis is necessary prior to acting, and that a holistic approach is required. Problem-oriented policing offers a great deal of support for such a philosophy, and, as previously highlighted in this chapter, research exists that

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suggests that problem-oriented policing against gang crime is effective- with the Boston Project's Cease Fire probably being the best known example (Kennedy, 1997).

The fundamental philosophy adopted by SGIP – POP – discussed above has, therefore, substantial support in research, even though hitherto support for the Panther model in analysis has previously been subject to criticism. A comprehensive picture of weaknesses in the Panther model will be discussed in this section.

In one chapter of the manual (Part 1, chapter 3, pages 52-78) a number of works that are said to have influenced the Panther model are presented. Their links to the model are not described. This makes it difficult to obtain any clarity about the Panther model's theoretical position. It is also difficult to understand why it has been decided to highlight certain research, e.g., ways of patrolling (Kelling et al, 1974) and response times (Bayley, 1998). What relevance do these have to work on gang crime and in which way have they been used in the production of the Panther model? Earlier in this report, it has been stated that the general description of the different stages in the Panther model is flimsy and that the theoretical support in the form of references is weak. It is therefore difficult for the reader to get an idea of the actual content of the Panther model and its basis.

When combating a large grouping, the likelihood is that an operational initiative will lead to individuals being taken into custody on various occasions. The investigatory work is then tailored for certain individuals, while the operational initiative will probably continue against other individuals. According to the Panther model, the phase involving tactical operations is, however, separated from the investigation phase. The manual also states that the prosecutors are involved in the work even before anyone is suspected in order to be able to influence the investigatory work at an early stage. The tactical operations and investigation phases give the impression of overlapping with each other. In the Panther model, however, it looks like there are two clearly separate phases.

The manual refers to problem-oriented policing, for which there is extensive research and clear descriptions of two approaches. From the descriptions in the project plan and the manual, it is clear that SGIP does not involve a traditional POP project. Instead their objective is to claim after the project to have developed a concept of their own – the Panther model (see pages 13 and 324.) It states that the Panther model is largely based on POP with the process used in POP projects (SARA) - (page 187). The section where the model is described does not clearly state what is involved in the Panther model's tactical operations phase. In problem-oriented policing, a number of different measures may be involved that do not really fit the description of "Tactical Operations". POP involves performing an unconditional analysis of a particular problem before deciding on which measures will be suitable. The Panther model is, however, described as a process consisting of five stages (see page 113), where the tactical operations and investigation phases are already predefined before the analysis is performed. This counteracts the actual basic concept of POP. An explanation should have been provided for why the Panther model's diagram has been formulated in a way that does not follow the concept on which the model is claimed to be based.

Problem-oriented policing is cited as having played an important role in the production of the Panther model, but there are only a few references to this field of research. References to research projects that have utilised problem-oriented policing against gang crime have been omitted. Since the project management team states that the new philosophy is based on problem-oriented policing, it would have been necessary for them to establish a clear contrast

and explain what is different and why they decided to deviate from the general model and different projects that had worked in this way. This had not been done.

To sum up, from a theoretical perspective there is no reason to attach any importance to the Panther model. There is only a weak argument and theoretical foundation for why the model has been formulated as it is. Additionally, the content of the model's various components is unclear.

There may nevertheless be grounds for devoting some interest to the Panther model if there is strong empirical data. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

3.2 Analysis of how SGIP has based the Panther model on empirical data

3.2.1 Local intelligence centres (LUCs)

Cooperation has taken place with other authorities, focussing on getting at criminals by going after their money. Representatives of the Police, the Social Insurance Agency, the Tax Agency and the Enforcement Service have met to further this end. As previously described, this cooperation has been effective. It has been stated during interviews that it is this cooperation forum to which they are referring to when they speak of local intelligence centres. However, according to the model, the social services, the Regional Public Prosecution Office and the Prison Service should also be involved in the local intelligence centres. It is clear from the evaluation, however, that this has not been the case.

The manual states that prosecutors have traditionally had to spend a lot of time familiarising themselves with different investigations during the final phase of a case but that the Panther model means that the Regional Public Prosecution Office is involved in the process even before someone can be suspected of a crime (see page 115). The evaluation has not been able to establish that the model's recommended procedure with regard to the Regional Public Prosecution Office's involvement actually corresponds with the reality during the period of the project.

To sum up, there is evidence that only some of the activities that should, according to the Panther model, be performed by the local intelligence centres have an empirical basis.

3.2.2 Social initiative groups (SIGs) and social coordination groups

The manual gives examples of how social initiative groups are organised (see page 106). There is only one municipality in Södertörn Police District that has a social initiative group, but it is not organised in the same way as described in the manual. In addition, during interviews with key individuals in the local initiative group, it has emerged that the initiative group could not be part of the Panther model. The initiative group has nothing to do with SGIP and the work in the local initiative groups does not have the focus on gangs that the Panther model suggests. The work in the social initiative group primarily relies on information from the police offices in Fittja, Hallunda and Storvreten. The offices develop

their knowledge though active work in the areas and are not part of SGIP or the Panther model.

The manual also states that: "*one of the most important aspects of prevention is identifying and linking resources in the local community to the model*" (see page 99). It is possible to connect resources to a project but it is unclear what is meant by linking resources in the local community to a model. It is stated that SGIP has used social coordination groups in its preventive work against gang crime (see page 99). The evaluators have not been given access to data to prove that this is the case apart from the project management team stating that this is the case. The manual describes a social coordination group called Ungsam (see page 100). In an interview with a key actor in this coordination group, the claim is made that SGIP is not involved in their work. This group was formed long before SGIP and has an entirely independent role and is not part of the project or the Panther model. The work in Ungsam is, however, of interest but it is not within the remit of this evaluation to describe it.

To sum up, the schematic diagram of the Panther model in this section has no basis in reality.

3.2.3 Empirical data linked to the different phases

SGIP has consisted of the Mungo, Arion and Lima initiatives. Only one of the initiatives, LIMA, has contained an operational phase targeting an identified street gang. It has emerged during interviews that in some of the weeks that LIMA was taking place, the focus moved away from the Panther model and personnel began working on tips in the same way as they had done before SGIP started. According to the manager, this was because the strategic persons were difficult to find.

Only some elements of the Panther model have been tested during the project. The documentation describing what each phase has involved is weak. It has, however, not been possible to obtain information about how method selection was actually undertaken during LIMA. The formulation of the Panther model is also based on empirical data obtained before the SGIP project began. This empirical data is not made explicit when the structure of the Panther model is explained. In at least one case before SGIP started, the unit failed in an initiative against a gang when an early version of the Panther model was being followed. The claim is made that combating this type of gang was difficult with the operational capacity available at SGI. The gang operated over a large area and other operational resources would have been required to deal with it. A few years after this initiative, however, there was some success in prosecuting some of the key persons in the gang in question. Interviews indicate that the surveying of the gang done during the previous SGI initiative was an important success factor. They knew how the gang operated, including their reconnaissance procedures and the use of lookouts. It was thereby possible to adapt the intervention to the knowledge they had of the gang.

Police resources are limited and, as is the case with other activities, this factor must be taken into account when choosing different methods for tackling gang crime. During SGIP the decision was taken that the work would be conducted against a certain grouping for a period of time. It could be the case that surveying different gangs and making use of this knowledge when the occasion arises is a more efficient use of resources. Circumstances dictate that situations arise all the time where there are opportunities to take action. If the activity is entirely focused on a certain grouping, there is a risk that the decision will be taken not to

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make the most of favourable occasions to tackle other groupings. The claim has been made that this is a problem with the Panther model because its structure means that the activity will be far too static and inflexible. The problem when such arguments are put forward is that there is very little empirical data to which to refer to support the assertion that the Panther model is of benefit in tackling gang crime. The empirical data referred to is not sufficiently explanatory.

An example of this is that the project management team has highlighted as proof that the model is effective the fact that the motorcycle gang targeted during the LIMA project was forced to move its club premises. The Södertörn police has however succeeded on a number of occasions with initiatives like these without using the Panther model. Interviews suggest that things moved even more quickly on other occasions when action was taken directly against the phenomenon instead of spending considerable time on scanning and surveying. SGIP provides no answer to why this is the case. Overall, there is very little argument presented regarding the empirical basis for the Panther model's structure, and no account of the different attitudes adopted when the model was formulated.

To sum up, there is a very limited amount of empirical data generated during SGIP that can be used to strengthen the Panther model's structure. It is more the case that the Panther model gives the impression of being an ideas document rather than having a well-founded empirical basis.

4. The way the activity is presented

4.1 Painting an attractive picture

Sherman (1990) has found that the mass media's focus on a certain area/certain type of crime can make the police temporarily raise its priorities in this area/for this type of crime. Palm and Skogersson point out that it has become an increasingly important thing for organisations to communicate the right picture of their own activity (Palm & Skogersson, 2008). Other researchers dealing with this theme include Eterno and Silverman (2012) who, in their book subtitled "Management by Manipulation", illustrate the problem of the police wanting to represent their activities in a certain way without there being any support for it, it actually being contrary to important indicators of true developments. Holgersson has drawn similar conclusions with regard to the Swedish police (Holgersson, 2005; Holgersson, 2013).

When it comes to the earlier presentation of SGI's activity there has been substantial focus on prosecution statistics. The number of years people have been sentenced to prison is described as a measurement of success. Among other things it was stated in 2004 that the unit had been responsible for 197 gang criminals being sentenced to a total of 370 years in prison with approximately 60 members serving their sentences at the same time (Puhakka & Ferngren, 2005). Several interviews suggest that SGI's way of reporting the outcome of the activity is misleading[13]. This is a claim made by both people who have worked with SGI and others with a good idea of their work. SGI's reported results do not make clear that if a person was convicted in another district it could be counted in the statistics, e.g., if a drug addict was sentenced to a long prison sentence for a serious drug offence due to a case conducted by the Nyköping police. SGI conducted a small raid of peripheral importance. The long prison sentence was, however, included in the statistics as an outcome of SGI's activity. Even using such a far-reaching interpretation, it has not been possible using the registers of offences and criminal records to reach the number of prison years that the Stockholm police presented as the result of SGI's activity in official contexts.

Another measurement unit used as evidence of the success of SGI's activity was the number of firearms and street fighting weapons seized. In 2004, it was stated that the unit had seized 136 firearms and about 3,000 street fighting weapons since 1999 (Puhakka & Ferngren, 2005). An examination of the Södertörn police's reports and seizures in which personnel from SGI had been involved showed that the number of weapons seized was only about half of the alleged figure. Seizures have also been made in districts other than Södertörn but interviews indicate that these seizures were not as extensive.

Verifying the information that the unit succeeded in seizing about 3,000 street fighting weapons has not been possible. Checking these figures is problematic since many of these seizures were never documented. In an examination of the number of seizures reported it has not even been possible to verify twenty percent of the alleged figure. In interviews with personnel at the unit, several of them state that the alleged figures cannot be correct and that they are sure of this because, during certain periods, they closely monitored the outcome of their work and how the stated results differed from the actual outcome.

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[13] There are no indications to suggest that SGI currently has this approach.

When it comes to the number of drug offences reported, these have not been checked, but interviews point to the same situation there. It is stated that the figures do not concur with the actual outcome of the activity. The manner in which SGI reported its statistics must be seen in context. It was not the case that SGI's way of presenting the activity was or is a unique occurrence in the Stockholm police. The fact that this is not a case of unfortunate circumstances becomes clear when we take an overall view and analyse a number of the Stockholm police's reports on other types of activity (see also Holgersson, 2013). SGI's way of working and reporting the results meant that the outcome of the activity was continually subject to media exposure. The police's work was presented as successful. Several interviewees believe that this was advantageous for the allocation of resources to the unit.

4.2 SGIP

There is a risk that units felt more or less forced to work in a particular fashion in order to achieve specific results. It is clear that at several other units where personnel were interviewed, the particular focus on quantitative production statistics called "chasing statistics" has had negative consequences for the activity. Working methods are adopted because they are effective in demonstrating satisfactory results, not because they have the greatest chance of having an effect (see also Holgersson, 2007; Holgersson & Knutsson, 2011). Interviews at SGIP suggest undercurrents such as this in this unit but that, generally speaking, SGIP has had a great deal of freedom to apply the methods it considered suitable.

During interviews with personnel at SGIP, the claim has been made that the police informing the media about their work to combat organised crime could be counterproductive. This is partly because some gangs may benefit greatly from the police spreading information about them in the media. It might strengthen their "brand". Gangs may also feel challenged by various statements. The police management team may, however, have an interest in showing that the activity is successful or that the police are in control with regard to a specific problem. During the SGIP project, a request was made by the police management team to publicise information that the unit had succeeded in shutting down the club premises of a motorcycle gang. Information like this was regarded as good PR for the police. Personnel at SGIP opposed this kind of media presentation and clearly stated that this approach ran the risk of having negative consequences. The police management team listened to the arguments from SGIP and decided not to make this information public.

The police management team have decided to focus on, among other things, police office activity which has been very favourable for the police from a media perspective. There are seven police offices in Södertörn. Total staffing at these offices is almost four times greater than the operational resources at SGIP. When the police get good PR by focusing on a certain activity, there is a major risk that other activities not generating as positive an image will not be given the same scope. During the entire period of the project, the personnel resources at SGIP were reduced despite the increase in the total number of police. For the police authority, simply reporting that an EU project was being carried out was not sufficient to get good PR.

Since SGIP's philosophy has entailed performing its work more discreetly than before, the outcome became of peripheral importance from a media point of view. From a presentation aspect, SGIP's work became less interesting. The focus has been on tackling key figures – not on prosecuting as many people as possible and publicising it in the media. It is important that

the police allocate resources that can work in the long term against a certain type of crime and that the personnel are given the opportunity to apply methods adapted to the situation and not to external pressure to enable easily reported statistics or particular results (see, for example, Holgersson & Knutsson, 2011).

The Stockholm police have allocated such limited operational resources to SGIP that there has been no chance of achieving important project objectives. As previously pointed out, this is something that has been stated internally within the Stockholm Police, but is not explained when the project and the Panther model are presented in the manual. Problems have been raised regarding implementation, such as the fact that the gang unit was closed during the summer and that at certain times it was difficult to get all personnel to understand the importance of the scanning and analysis phase. But the fact that they did not actually have the prerequisites for dealing with the task has not been stated.

Interviews and participative observations have indicated that it has been difficult to implement the new way of working during SGIP. One reason was that external staff preferred to be involved in cases that focused on other aspects than these key figures. This was partly due to the fact that they felt they were doing more good when they performed an intervention resulting in seizures and prosecutions than when they spent their time on the surveillance of a key figure in order to gather information. However, there are differences here between different police officers. It has been stated that similar problems apply to certain individuals in managerial positions. It has also been stated that the material was not always available to work with, so when something else turned up, they preferred to take that.

Interviews indicate that it is very important for the working method to be understood by personnel for it to be effective. Situations actually arise all the time where police personnel have the opportunity to take action against people other than the key figures. The personnel's perception of what is important to work on is reinforced by the feedback they receive. If management states that things have gone well in a certain month because the unit has carried out a certain number of seizures of weapons and drugs, which, in some cases, happened at SGIP, introducing a new way of working that is not based on them generating quick results may be problematic.

Another reason why it has been difficult to implement the model is the limited supply of operational personnel during the project and the fact that the unit's investigators have had to spend a lot of time working on investigations that are not linked to the project's efforts. The factor discussed in the manual, that the gang unit was temporarily closed down during the summer period, has also affected the capacity to work on the tasks intended during the project. In addition, on certain occasions in periods other than the summer, the personnel have been released for other activities.

Several statements in the manual give the impression that the project management team have been under pressure to say that the project has been successful and exaggerated the outcome of the project. An example of this is when the assertion is made that: "*We have applied this knowledge operationally in several interventions. We will describe one of these in an example below (operation LIMA)"* (see page 125). This statement gives the impression that several similar operational interventions have been carried out in addition to LIMA. The results of the evaluation indicate that this is not the case. It is only LIMA that has resulted in an operational intervention against an identified street gang. As a reader, you are lulled into believing that the project has a greater empirical basis than it has and that the Panther model has been

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implemented to a greater extent than it actually has. For example, the final words of the manual state that SGIP resulted in "holistic" policing and the implementation of a gang model against street gangs (see page 324). The evaluation has shown that elements of the Panther model have not been implemented. It is more the case that the description of the Panther model should be seen as a conceptual document regarding how an activity should function than a reflection of how SGIP has worked.

The assertion that the Panther model involves a new philosophy (see page 13) is contradicted by the fact that it simultaneously states that many other crime-prevention authorities in Europe are working in a similar fashion but using different names for their models (see page 325). It would have been desirable to link work in other countries to the explanations and arguments regarding the structure of the Panther model. This would have reduced the risk of the Panther model being perceived as a pretty façade with a weak theoretical and empirical basis.

5. Concluding words

Generally speaking, the police have found it difficult to introduce new ways of working. They have instead continued to work in much the same way as before (see also Holgersson, 2008; Holgersson & Knutsson, 2012). Getting personnel behind a new way of working is a major challenge. Previous research shows that it is difficult to get personnel to work in a certain way through various forms of directive (Ekman, 1999; Holgersson, 2005). The lessons learned from the implementation of POP show, however, that even though it might be difficult to have an impact on an entire police force, there are numerous examples of successful applications of problem-oriented policing, including projects targeting gangs. Knowledge is also available of what the prerequisites are for implementing successful POP projects.

The factors emphasised include decisive and supportive managers, and committed and knowledgeable project workers. If external POP specialists are available, this is a strength. It is also important that resources are assigned for running the project. External support from, for example, the mass media or external organisations may also be important. Involving organisations that can implement the proposed measures is, of course, vital. This will be more likely if they are expected to take the kind of action that they normally take. Another important factor is to have a clear and convincing description of the problem and for the proposed measures to be easy to understand on the basis of descriptions and analyses (Scott, 2000; Knutsson, 2006; Knutsson & Søvik, 2005). It is important that time and resources are allocated to train and motivate the personnel expected to perform a certain task. An understanding is important so that the tasks can be performed as intended. It is possible to learn lessons from SGIP with regard to the difficulties involved in implementing a new way of working. This type of experience is important. It would have been rewarding if SGIP had described experiences like this in a detailed manner so that others could learn lessons from them.

There is also a need for the police to be adventurous in trying out new working methods. Even if some attempts do not have the intended outcome, it is nevertheless important that they are not regarded as failures. In order to be able to learn lessons, it is, however, vital that these attempts are described in a true and fair manner. This evaluation has endeavoured to do this. It is also necessary for the organisation to have the genuine ambition of benefiting from experiences gained. A new project to combat serious organised crime is underway in the Stockholm police. It will be interesting to study to what extent the organisation benefits from SGIP in the future.

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